Public Lecture by H.E. Benjamin William Mkapa at the Inaugural Makerere University Grand Alumni Re-Union, 28 November 2009
Honorable Prof. Gilbert Balibaseka Bukenya,
Vice-President of the Republic of Uganda;
Honorable Prof. Apolo Nsibambi,
Prime Minister of the Republic of Uganda;
Honorable Rebecca Kadaga,
Deputy Speaker of the Ugandan Parliament;
Honorable Ministers and Members of Parliament;
Excellencies High Commissioners and Ambassadors;
Prof. Mondo Kagonyera
Chancellor of Makerere University;
Prof. Venansius Baryamureeba,
Vice-Chancellor of Makerere University;
Faculty, Staff and Students of Makerere University;
Fellow Alumni;
Distinguished Guests;
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Let me begin by thanking the government of Uganda and the Makerere University community for welcoming me so warmly and for the honor you have bestowed upon me to speak on behalf of my fellow alumni on a very important subject, on a very important day and a very propitious occasion.
It is always a great pleasure to return to Makerere, and today is no exception. Indeed, today is an historical home-coming not only for me but I am sure for all my fellow alumni. Thank you for welcoming us back.
I want to thank and congratulate the University Convocation and authorities for the idea to convene this grand alumni re-union. With the support of all of us, which by being here we promise, I am sure this re-union will be a great success and a rewarding experience to everyone. Working together we can give our beloved Alma Mater new energy, new vision and new direction.
In a special way I want to thank the Vice-President for that most gracious oratory, which I am not sure if I entirely deserve. Thank you all the same, and thank you Mr. Chancellor as well for your very kind words.
As part of these celebrations I have been asked to speak on, “The Role of the Alumni in Governance and Institutional Development.”
But before I do so I want us to step back and look again at the context in which we assembled here, and others like us across sub-Saharan Africa, received the higher education that lies at the heart of who we have since become. It is a very profound thought.
I came to Makerere in the nineteen fifties aged 19. Makerere was at that time a University College affiliated to the University of London. It was a small institution then; enrollement was in the hundreds not thousands. There were four halls of residence, three for males and one for female students. Staff was predominantly British and a touch South African. Local, i.e. African, staff could be counted on the fingers of two hands.
Then graduating from Makerere was a great achievement. One felt immensely privileged not only because entry was acutely competitive, but also because jobs were assured. Employers would visit to sample prospective graduates. Remuneration for these jobs was quite high. But more importantly was the prospect of high standing in public office, in the professions and the administration. Being an ex-Makekererian gave one enormous social status. It may have bred a little Elitism but this was tempered by the call for social and political responsibility.
The University College had, for its Vision and Mission this statement on its Coat of Arms: “Pro Future Aedificamus,” which we translated into: “We are building for the future” I notice that the motto has been retained on Makerere University’s logo: “We Build for the Future. “Why the Latin text was abandoned I look forward to learning this afternoon.
Statistics from UNESCO show that in 2007, on average, only six percent of tertiary education cohort in sub-Saharan Africa was enrolled in colleges and universities. And this is considered a huge improvement considering where we came from.
In the time of my matriculation, I believe the ratio was less than one percent. In Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere’s time it was nothing short of scandalous, and our former colonial masters need to hang their heads in shame. In Mwalimu’s own words, when he sat for the then Makerere College entrance examination in the early 1940s, there were only three schools in the whole of the then Tanganyika which could send students here at Makerere, the only such institution of higher learning at that time in the whole of this region.
In 1949 and 1950, five, yes five only, African students from Tanganyika, Mwalimu Nyerere being one of them, received scholarships to study in the United Kingdom. According to him no other scholarships were given for more than five years.
What does this mean? It means two things. The first is that the former colonial powers did not consider it a priority to prepare Africans for leadership, for good governance and for institution building. And, as we all know, their own form of colonial administration was the antithesis of democratic good governance.
The second point is that the post independence alumni have a two-pronged responsibility beyond their own transformation through education. They have to realize that the responsibility to build democratic political dispensations, and to develop governance systems and build institutions of governance and regulation needed for economic and social transformation lies not with anyone else but with them. They cannot and must not have the luxury of being unaccountable spectators as the continent grapples with these profound challenges.
Their other responsibility is to be role models and positive mentors of new generations of educated Africans. Again, let us step back, and consider our ways, wherever we may be, and whatever we are doing. Have we been good role models, and have we mentored new generations of educated Africans in the right direction? What have they learnt from us--not from our words, but from our actions--and what will they learn from successive generations of alumni? Have we built the foundations of good governance and strong institutions that can outlive us, or are we passing on the buck to the next generation?
But above all, those proportionally very few of us who receive or have received higher education in postcolonial Africa have to realize how privileged we are, and that with that privilege comes responsibility.
An alumnus of Makerere, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, put the expectations that society has in those privileged to be educated in the following terms:
“Those who receive this privilege, therefore, have a duty to repay the sacrifice which others have made. They are like the man who has been given all the food available in a starving village in order that he might have the strength to bring supplies from a distant place. If he takes this food and does not bring help to his brothers, he is a traitor. Similarly, if any of the young men and women who are given an education by the people of this republic adopt attitudes of superiority, or fail to use their knowledge to help the development of this country, then they are betraying our union.”
Mr Chancellor,
Ladies and Gentlemen:
These are without doubt very strong words; but they need to be said from time to time because they are a useful compass to all of us privileged to have had a good education at a critical time for the development of our countries, their governance systems and institutions.
In my time here we had a very friendly Catholic Chaplain, an English Dominican named Paul Foster O.P. It is not for his preaching, which was unquestionably inspiring and mercifully short, that I recall him now. Rather I recall him for a long and contentious conversation we had about that University College motto. What kind of future were we building? How were we building it? He thought it exemplified well the British penchant for obfuscation or equivocation in order to make everyone feel good!!
I have revisited Makerere a few times. It has grown a great deal in terms of physical intrastructures, academic disciplines and the sizes of the annual enrollment and graduands. There is a lot to be proud of and to congratulate ourselves upon. I hope that the reunion gives us the opportunity to look back, reflect and renew our spirits.
When I was given the invitation to make these remarks I decided to ask the alumni, but especially the graduating classes of the nineteen sixties, my contemporaries. What kind of a future have we built? How have we lived to our education motto’s injuction?
The independence movement was reaching its climax as we graduated. We entered the political and labour market. Thus we have helped build independence from colonial rule. Have we built a sense of nationhood? We have helped to build, indeed others would say to shape, the civil service. Is it a dedicated, faithful and loyal civil service? We have been instrumental in building up an array of professional associations. How professionally ethical are they?
The Alumni and Their Alma Mater:
But let me now turn to the relationship between the alumni and their Alma Mater, and the role that I see for the alumni in institutional governance and development. You see, the relationship between an alumnus or alumnae with his or her Alma Mater is kind of like the relationship between a child and its parents. We can grow up as children, and then move out to chart our own paths and begin our own families. Sometimes we may have strained relationships with our parents, some quite serious. But nothing on earth can change the fact that they are, and will forever remain, our parents.
In a family, what unites the offspring is their organic relationship with the parents. Likewise, what unites all of us in this alumni re-union is the relationship that each one of us has with Makerere. We have a duty to support our parents; and we have a duty to support our Alma Mater. Both made us what we are today, and both need and deserve our support. But just as they have the right to expect support, they equally have to be open to our views and opinions. As much as possible the alumni have to feel they are welcome to contribute to issues of governance and institution building in this university.
There is the story of an honest young boy and an old man:
Old gentleman: You’re an honest boy. But it was a ten dollar-note not ten ones that I lost.
Small boy: I know, mister, it was a ten-dollar note I picked up. But the last time I found one, the man who owned it didn’t have any change.
Sometimes it takes the wisdom of a child to get something out of a man!
If the alumni are remembered only for fundraising purposes, important as it is, the relationship will never be as strong and the role of the alumni never as robust as one would have liked. As alumni, we care deeply about this university. The collective professional and personal experiences we hold are a huge resource for the university. Keep the alumni informed and connected--with Makerere and with each other. And I truly appreciate what I have learnt since coming here about your commendable efforts in this very direction. Please keep it up; you have our support and encouragement. We are your product, we are the living proof of your excellence in learning, and we shall always be your loudest cheerleaders.
In that spirit, let me raise a few issues that I think are critical in the governance and institutional development of this and other institutions of higher learning in sub-Saharan Africa.
The Paradox of Scope: The African Scene:
A few years ago, Prof. David J. Collis of the Harvard Business School wrote a piece titled “The Paradox of Scope: A Challenge to the Governance of Higher Education”. Although the discourse clearly had in mind universities in the West, in particular the United States of America, some of his points are equally relevant to our circumstances in Africa and elsewhere and provide a good entry point for some of my arguments.
In short, the concept of “paradox of scope” refers to the inherent friction between the core (conservative, if you like) values and mission of an institution on the one hand, and the demands imposed on it by a kaleidoscopic (radical, if you like) periphery and external environment that can threaten the very relevance and sustainability of an institution. Universities are believed to be conservative in nature; but they now have to learn to adapt to new situations. In the words of Prof. Collis:
“Circumstances today are conspiring to expose the inherent weaknesses in the governance of higher education. The external environment of universities and colleges is undergoing profound change: globalization, technology, the massification of tertiary education, the emergence of the knowledge economy, and the intrusion of market forces into the sector, among other forces and trends, all threaten to disrupt the hallowed halls of academia in ways not experienced before. If universities and colleges are to successfully adapt to these unavoidable societal trends, they must develop, communicate, and implement clear and concise strategies. The hallmark of those strategies will be a willingness to make difficult choices among very different alternatives”
Across the world, the dynamics of social, economic and technological changes, and the demands placed on tertiary education institutions, require a continuous re-evaluation of academic governance and institutional building. For African universities the challenges are even more formidable. Makerere cannot be an exception.
My experience, not just as President of Tanzania, but immediately before that as Minister for Higher Education, Science and Technology, is that among the governance challenges that typically confront African universities are the following:
• Funding and Accountability.
• Student enrollment, retention and graduation rates.
• Responding to the special needs of “non-traditional” students, including distance and adult learning.
• The pressure to make governance more inclusive and responsive to the often competing needs of a much wider array of stakeholders, including alumni, business sector, parents, student bodies, government, and others, all of whom seek an opportunity to determine how tertiary education is designed and managed.
• Dealing with the high expectations and volatility of faculty, including issues of remuneration, tenure and career development, and hence the issue of brain drain;
• Working and interpersonal relationships between faculty and administrators, and hence the question whether traditional institutions of academic governance can resolve emerging frictions and chart a common vision and strategy;
• Curriculum development and adaptation;
• Relevance and competitiveness and hence issues of quality versus quantity of output.
I should like to address some of these issues in greater detail.
Enrolment, Retention and Graduation Rates:
We all know that education, and certainly higher education, is a sine qua non for personal and societal development and adaptability. That is why all countries, without exception, including the most advanced ones, invest more and more in increasing enrolment, retention and graduation rates in their tertiary education institutions. As H.G. Wells summed up the challenge ninety years ago, “Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe”.
The risk of such catastrophe in sub-Saharan Africa is real. Most of our countries have no more than 50 years of independence. Yet, we cannot escape from being held, by our own people and by the outside world, to the highest standards of governance and institutional competence, whether in government, in academia or in the private sector.
A recent UNESCO report captures four decades of “explosive growth” in tertiary enrolment in Africa. In 1970, it says, there were fewer than 200,000 students enrolled in tertiary institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. By 2007, this number had increased more than twenty-fold to 4 million. Enrolment over this period of time increased by 8.6 percent annually on average, compared to a global average of 4.6 percent over the same period. More recently, between 2000 and 2005, the average annual growth rate reached 10 percent.
Should we pat ourselves on the back? Definitely no!
On the one hand, this phenomenal growth has had huge implications for governance and institution-building in our colleges and universities. The political desire to expand enrolment was not always backed by a corresponding increase in budgetary allocation. As a result, over time, quality of instruction and output began to suffer, motivation declined and on campus tensions increased.
On the other hand, pressure for increased enrolment continues unabated, especially as secondary school expansion creates an ever-increasing wellspring of young men and women looking for matriculation in the few tertiary education institutions we have. And, at 3.1 percent, Africa has the fastest growth of the tertiary education cohort population, compared to a global average of only 1.7 percent.
We cannot, unfortunately, ignore or wish away this escalating demand for expansion of enrolment. I mentioned earlier that in 2007, only 6 percent of the tertiary education cohort in sub-Saharan Africa was enrolled in tertiary education institutions. This should be seen against a global average of 26 percent. In North America and Western Europe the rate was 71 percent that same year; in Central and Eastern Europe it was 62 percent; in Latin America and the Caribbean it was 34 percent; in Central Asia it was 31 percent; in East Asia and the Pacific it was 26 percent; in Arab States it was 23 percent; in South and West Asia it was 11 percent; and in sweet home sub-Saharan Africa it was only 6 percent. A huge improvement from where the colonialists left us, but still only 6 percent! Even South Africa, the best performer among us, had a gross enrolment ratio of only 15.4 percent.
So, much as I sympathize with our colleges and universities, there is no way the pressure to expand enrolment will abate for many years to come. These pressures also bring to the fore the challenges of retention and graduation rates. Some privately sponsored students drop out when poverty or bereavement disconnects the lifeline to continued university participation. Social tensions that can partly be explained by declining resources can also disrupt classes or precipitate rustication, temporarily or permanently.
Then, of course, there is the issue of gender parity in tertiary education that is becoming more involving with each passing year. Nobody believes these days the Hausa saying that, “the strength of woman is nothing but talk”. On average, sub-Saharan African counties have made commendable progress in, raising the ratio of women in tertiary education from 22 percent in 1970 to 40 percent in 2007. It should be noted, however, that the commendable achievement of a few African countries tend to obscure the serious challenges that remain in other countries. The leading success stories include Botswana (50%), Swaziland (50%), Mauritius (53%), Cape Verde (55%), Lesotho (55%), and South Africa (55%). But these should not eclipse the challenges in Chad (13%), Guinea (21%), Central African Republic (22%), Ethiopia (25%) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (26%).
A road accident involving a man and a woman occurred one day, and the ensuing conversation went as follows:
Female driver: But I insist it was all my fault.
Male driver: No, my lady, it WAS my fault. I could tell your car was driven by a woman at least half a mile away, and I could easily have driven into the field and avoided this!
Believe me; it will take some time to get rid of some of the outrageous prejudices against women.
Funding and Accountability:
Mr. Chancellor
Ladies and Gentlemen:
The persistent pressure for expansion of enrolment, retention and graduation comes against a background of shrinking resource envelops for tertiary education relative to the rate of expansion. This is so even when per capita expenditure per tertiary student relative to GDP is exceedingly high. According to UNESCO, Benin, Burundi, Ethiopia and Togo have per capita higher education expenditure levels in excess of 100 percent of GDP per capita. In Niger it is 371 percent!
Across the world, funding university education continues to be a major challenge, even among the wealthy countries. The challenge of governance in those countries, as in ours, is not simply to fold our arms and bemoan declining or inadequate public funding, but how to diversify sources of funding in a way that is consistent with our goals and strategies. This balancing act, however, becomes increasingly difficult to maintain especially as universities rely more and more on outside funding sources, each with its own interests, goals and strategies. Again this is a huge challenge of governance.
Among sources of funding that universities across the world have resorted to are the alumni, private sector, consultancy, partnerships with business, research funding, increasing tuition fees, various endowments, donations and grants, introduction of student loans, and in the case of developing countries, donor support. Others make businesslike investments, on their own or in joint venture with external entities. The University of Dar es Salaam, for instance, used part of their land to attract investors in shopping malls, hotels and apartments. I am sure Makerere and others do likewise.
But, again, I have to repeat. While new revenue streams can assuage the thirst for funding, they bring with them new demands on the governance of universities which may prove challenging. Managing and meeting the needs and standards of diverse sources of revenue is a sufficient challenge. But added to this is that each new player, some of them very peripheral to the core mission of the university, may want to play a part in setting the direction towards which the university will move.
Mr Chancellor
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Another way to deal with funding shortfalls is to downsize the wide array of activities that universities have to deal with. Increasingly, in business, in academia and even in government, the trend has been to outsource non-core, or even some core, functions to entities with greater capacity to deal with them at lower costs. These may include activities such as:
• academic services, such as admissions, media and video conferencing, and testing;
• administrative services;
• advertising and marketing;
• athletics/sports;
• auxiliary services such as bookstores, vending machines, laundry, and housing;
• computer facilities and information systems;
• development and public relations, including fundraising, printing, and institutional research; distributors and wholesalers for commercial and industrial equipment and supplies;
• financial aid-related services;
• accounting, financial and investment services;
• legal services;
• library resources;
• personnel services, including benefits administration, retirement programs, and executive recruitment; plant services, such as maintenance, building design, and security; and,
• student services, such as substance abuse programs and medical services.
Some of these measures could help save real money.
Let me now say a few words about tuition fees. Unfortunately, across the world, the trend has been to increase tuition and other fees that students are charged in an effort to balance the books. But for poor countries like ours this can be counterproductive if the fees are so high as to defeat the goal of increasing enrolment. That is why more African countries have to design and implement effective student loan programs. This is the only way to build capacity to expand enrolment, without turning universities into places for the elite in each society.
An idea worth pursuing is to ask the donor community to create a capital fund to underwrite student loans for needy students in sub-Saharan Africa.
Governments cannot totally abdicate responsibility to fund higher education. But, having been in government, I realize that people want to see more results for each shilling invested in higher education. Perhaps the time has come for institutions of higher learning to be asked to develop and sign performance contracts, with clear deliverables, quantitative and qualitative, in exchange for public funding.
Governments on their part must create mechanisms to provide incentives for private companies, individuals and charitable organizations to help finance higher education. An example that quickly comes to mind is the provision of some form of tax allowances for such donations.
To encourage research, governments could also create a legal framework that allows universities to own and, therefore, to earn money from intellectual property rights. Governments and the business sector could also be encouraged to outsource research and development activities to universities.
Mr. Chancellor,
Ladies and Gentlemen:
These ideas constitute a menu of some of the things that can be done to increase funding for higher education. The only problem is that this, in the end, complicates governance. The more the donors, the more complex the task of assuring everyone that funds are properly used for the intended purposes, that procurement regulations are followed and that value for money is attained. So, in terms of governance, universities have to get used to more evaluations, more financial audits, and more reports.
Issues of Quality, Relevance and Competitiveness:
As we enter into an increasingly knowledge-based economy and a regionally and globally more competitive environment, quality education becomes more important than ever. This poses a huge challenge to sub-Saharan African countries and their higher learning institutions.
Former President of Rice University in Houston, Texas, Prof. Malcolm Gillis, could not have described this challenge better than when, in February 1999, he opined as follows:
“Today, more than ever before in human history, the wealth – or poverty – of nations depends on the quality of higher education. Those with a larger repertoire of skills and a greater capacity for learning can look forward to lifetimes of unprecedented economic fulfillment. But in the coming decades the poorly educated face little better than the dreary prospects of lives of quiet desperation”.
So, where does Africa stand on this score? One indicator that can be used in measuring where we stand is the amount of new knowledge we create in our universities. Since researchers do conceive and create new knowledge, their numbers can be a useful indicator of our capacity to create a repertoire of competitive and skilled individuals who can lead us to economic fulfillment.
Estimates issued by UNESCO Institute for Statistics two months ago show that between 2002 and 2007 Asia as a whole increased its share of world researchers from 35.7 percent to 41.4 percent, mostly at the expense of Europe and North America. In 2002, Africa had only 2.3 percent of researchers, and that share had not changed in 2007. For sub-Saharan Africa, if we exclude South Africa, we had only 0.6 percent of researchers in 2002 and still the same 0.6 percent in 2007. The phenomenal increase in Asia is to a large extent accounted for by China which had its share of world researchers increase from 14.0 percent in 2002 to 20.1 percent in 2007, putting it almost at par with the United States of America. Between them, the United States, China, European Union and Japan have 70 percent of all researchers in the world.
So what does this tell us? It provides pointers as to who will dominate the 21st century, if not beyond. But it also shows how much we risk being completely irrelevant except for our oil, mineral resources and agricultural commodities they need from us. We veritably risk being irrelevant in determining the course of human history and achievement. And, as Prof. Gillis said, we risk facing “little better than the dreary prospects of lives of quiet desperation”.
I give these statistics not to lead us into despondence, but as a wakeup call for governments, and for tertiary education institutions. We just have to produce more people who generate more new knowledge, not just those who use and recycle existing knowledge.
We can no longer procrastinate on the question of relevance of African higher education to the challenges confronting Africa today, and the kind of challenges we can already foresee for the future. Higher education is an extremely expensive investment made by the present poor African generation for the future. Such an investment, and the opportunity cost it entails with regard to other pressing demands on national treasuries, can only be justified by equally robust returns in terms of quality and relevance of output from our universities. And there are, in my view, four aspects of such quality and relevance:
• First, our young people must get the kind of university education that enables them to understand the present and future challenges of our countries in their broadest sense. In Tanzania, when I listen to, or read what is written by some university students or even some dons, I do not get the comfort that they have such an understanding, grounded in reality.
• Second, our young people must get the kind of university education that prepares them attitudinally and professionally to integrate with their society, not to be alienated from it. An elitist education that becomes a vehicle for the alienation of those we prepare for leadership would be a waste of scarce resources against competing demands, and a great tragedy.
• Third, the university education we give our young people must prepare them – again intellectually, attitudinally and professionally – to be agents and catalysts for positive change. We want them to graduate with inquiring sharpened minds, minds that thrive in original thinking, not ones that simply recycle western notions, ideas and prejudices.
• Fourth, university education must prepare our youth to be innovative and competitive, whether in public service or private sector – nationally, regionally and internationally – in a globalizing and competitive market for skills and jobs.
This brings me to the question of curricula. I have the hunch that our curricula are still too academic, too theoretical, with minimal applied science. Change has begun to come, it needs to come faster.
Textbooks are outdated, and we cannot always afford new editions or new publications. One way around this problem is to make increasing use of free but trusted online educational resources. Computing and internet access can provide relevant and current course material. In East Africa, we have just launched the first submarine optical fiber cable providing international bandwidth along the East Coast of Africa linking Southern and East Africa, Europe and South Asia.
As a matter of priority, African universities have to hook up to the global learning community. We should also now ask our development partners to support the infrastructural investment needed to make full use of the optic fiber bandwidth for research and learning, among other things. We on the African continent should also increase pressure to have more knowledge in the public domain through open access to research, including scientific, medical and engineering journals and data bases.
Alumni members of professional bodies have a unique opportunity to contibute to corriculum development at the University. Our world is witnessing vast and fast changes. Their own practice in the professions, in medicine or law, in agricultural extension or public policy research, in political governnance or social welfare delivery, uncovers new areas of interest and concern lacking in existing manuals and ways of doing things. Through dialogue and exchanges they can input into remarkable curriculum improvements that will strengthen academic competitiveness and raise international image.
But practicing professionals can also provide for short term or part time staff needs, just as academics can benefit from brief attachments to ongoing successful enterprises. This is the practice overseas; it is seldom if ever seen here. Yet the benefits that can accrue are worth the money they would cost. More importantly such exchanges would go a long way to nurture the town-grown partnership in learning and working. Theory is moderated by practice, and excessive industriousness is restrained by theorty. Let us give it a try.
African universities also have to learn how to cope with non-traditional students. Lifelong learning is the best way to prepare people for the increasing vagaries of the labor market, and ensure they remain employable and competitive. Universities must increasingly position themselves to meet their needs.
Coping with Brain Drain:
Many graduates emigrate. More than ten percent of African graduates overall emigrate. In technical and medical fields, the rate is much higher. It is said that 90 percent of all Zambian doctors trained in the last 30 years work abroad. It is also estimated that such brain drain costs sub-Saharan Africa close to $ 1 billion a year in educational investment made in their people. This is twice the amount of U.S. aid to the continent.
In the context of universal human rights and freedoms, it is difficult to issue a fiat against emigration. However, brain drain need not be a total loss. With more aggressiveness in the African side, and more understanding in richer countries, it is possible to turn brain drain into some kind of brain gain.
If Western countries are as concerned about brain drain in Africa as they claim to be, let them agree to put in place mechanisms to compensate Africa for this huge loss. With the advent and march of technology, solutions are now available to engage the African Diaspora, including alumni of African universities, in continuing to make contributions to capacity building and institutional development in Africa. Through telemedicine, African doctors in Western countries can take part in diagnosis, prescription and even surgery of patients in Africa. Through e-learning and the leveraging of the wide array of ICT capabilities and tools including things like tele-presence and other video capabilities, African academics in Western countries can continue to have classes in their Alma Mater or other universities, and they can continue to set and mark exams, or supervise the theses of post-graduate students from wherever they are. If they really want to, and if we on the African side press them, Western countries can make the resources available to get all this and more done.
Thanks to the presence of two formidable Nigerian ladies at the World Bank, Managing Director Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Vice-President for Africa Obiageli Ezekwesili, a program to engage the Diaspora in African development has been established in the Bank. The challenge now is for African governments, and specifically African universities, to engage the World Bank early on with clear strategies and plans on engaging the Diaspora in governance, institution building and service delivery for Africa’s social and economic development.
Another way to ensure the brain drain in Africa is not a total loss for the continent is to proceed from a simple logic. One of the reasons African graduates end up working in developed countries is that employers in western countries need and value them. The solution to brain drain, therefore, is not to try to stop Africans from going to work abroad, but to give African universities and governments the capacity to train more people. One mechanism is to ask employers in the west to reimburse the costs incurred by African countries to train every one of those alumni of our universities working abroad. And, for them, this will be quite a steal. In most African countries, it would take less than $50,000 to train a medical doctor, assuming 5 years of instruction and one year of internship. In a place like the United States, that amount is enough for only one academic year! By employing our alumni, they concede that we trained them well, and cost-effectively. We can do it repeatedly. Why do they not give African universities the capacity to train more, and better, and we can share the output?
Western employers, and even other employers in developing countries can in the very least, pay back the outstanding student loans owed by those they employ.
Engage, not Disengage:
One request I have for the alumni, especially those in the Diaspora, is for them to do much more to promote and encourage faculty and student exchanges with colleges and universities in the countries they reside in.
One of the most memorable characteristic of the Makerere of my time was its East Africanness. At that time it was the only university college in the four East African countries. Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and Tanzania were administered by the British, even if they were titularly identified as a colony, a protectorate and a trust territory respecitvely. The student community was a variety of tribal ethnicities and racial make up. There were a few students from Malawi and Zambia and from abroad.
Despite this wide diversity of origins we were a pretty united student community. We were united in our common aspiration to see our countries independent of British rule. There were individual country political groupings. But were reached to each other during important events in the political agenda of transition. We recognised the diversity of cultural traditions, but we were possionately East African. Happenings at East Africa House in London where diaspora fellow students would gather to discuss our region’s future strengthened or embrace at home.
At independence we had the East African High Commission which we later turned into the East African Community. It represented for many of us the precursor of what should have been an integrated East Africa, politically and economically. We decided to part ways in 1977. The rest is history, and in particular the harmful impact the breakdown has had on regional development.
But now a spirit of integration is resurging, and I would like to see Makerere alumni drive this surge. I ask that they renew the East Africanness which historically and inherently characterizes Makerere, to step up the momentum towards East African integration.
When four years ago the leaders of the re-born East African Community agreed on a Common Customs Union the defeatists loudly forecast sharp declines on state revenues. The opposite has traspired and they have been proven wrong. Revenues went up in all three states.
Last week, in Arusha, the five leaders of an enlarged East African Community signed the Protocol for the establishment of an East African Common Market, a great economic leap forward. Again the decision has not lacked its detractors. I ask alumni to take up the cudgels in defense of the Protocol. The Secretariat has illustrated how member states stand to gain with the Common Market. I must ask alumni again to be upfront in advocating its establishment. It is incredible and inexcusable that, in the midst of a global economic crtisis, while developed countries move faster towards their own integration, such as in the EU, poor countries, such as those in our community, should prevaricate and equivocate!!.
International Cooperation in Education
Most western countries have reduced their support to African higher education, including scholarship programs for post-graduate studies abroad on the pretext that they wanted to help us meet the MDG target for basic education. This is a fallacy. No country was ever built by people with only basic education. Governance and institution building, and even entrepreneurship, requires people with higher education and specialized knowledge and skills.
A study conducted to show cross-country correlations between higher education and good governance showed a clear positive and significant correlation between higher education and each of the following indicators of good governance: corruption in government; rule of law; bureaucratic quality; ethnic tensions; repudiation of contracts by government; and risk of expropriation.
Furthermore, the study showed a clear correlation between higher education and entrepreneurial activity. Individuals with higher levels of education have higher levels of entrepreneurial activity.
There is no doubt, therefore, that higher education is absolutely necessary in building strong and capable institutions in our countries, in developing the capacity to compete in the global knowledge economy, and in meeting our development goals. Knowledge has, and will continue to surpass physical capital as a source of wealth. As the 1998-99 World Development Report put it:
“Knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can
easily travel the world, enlightening the lives of people
everywhere. Yet billions of people still live in the darkness
of poverty-- unnecessarily”.
Education at all levels, including higher education, is the switch to turn on the light. People talk of the “green revolution”. The time has come to talk about an “intellectual revolution”. Our universities must not only develop capacity to deliver relevant curricula to more traditional and non-traditional students, but they have to be strong enough financially and in terms of faculty to do more research, and to develop capacity to acquire, absorb and internalize knowledge from the rest of the world.
It is our educated young people who will provide the capacity “to run more effective governments, develop the business of the future, and build the health and educational systems that make such a difference to the quality of life”.
We may not all be like Stanford University in California that developed the series of technology and entrepreneurship mentoring that produced the Silicon Valley, transforming the world. Nevertheless, we can, still make our own small contribution.
Conclusion:
Mr Chancellor
Ladies and Gentlemen:
There is a Yoruba proverb: “However far the stream flows, it never forgets its source”. So it is with us, alumni. The education we were privileged to get here launched us into various orbits of life experiences and achievement. But we cannot forget Makerere. Today we have the opportunity to show—in both word and deed--that we have not forgotten you, Makerere.
I came here to provoke a debate, not to provide readymade solutions to governance and institutional challenges that Makerere and other universities in Africa face. And having hopefully provoked you sufficiently, I will leave you with the ten most powerful two-letter words in the English language: IF IT IS TO BE, IT IS UP TO ME.
From our diverse origins we have converged here to pay homage and to support our Alma Mater. Together we can do it, and it is up to us. For, as the Archbishop of Canterbury said in Shakespeare’s King Henry V, Act I, sc. 2:
As many arrows, loosed several ways,
Come to one mark; as many ways meet in one town;
As many fresh streams meet in one salt sea;
As many lines close in the dial's centre;
So may a thousand actions, once afoot.
End in one purpose, and be all well borne
Without defeat…
One purpose, well borne, without defeat.
May fortune recover her eyesight and be just in the distribution of her favours.
I thank you for your kind attention.
Sunday, June 5, 2011
Saturday, June 4, 2011
Home >>> Speech by H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni President-Elect of the Republic of Uganda At the swearing in Speech by H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni President-Elect of the Republic of Uganda At the swearing in Mon, 2011-05-16 First of all, I congratulate all the Ugandans for the peaceful elections held on the 18th of February, 2011 and other elections held since that date. Secondly, I thank the Ugandans for overwhelmingly voting for me with 68.3%, the NRM Members of Parliament with 73%, District Leaders (LCV) with 79% Sub-County leaders (LCIII) with 71%. I also congratulate the opposition parties on the seats they got in Parliament, the District Council seats they got and the Sub-County positions they won. The landslide win by the NRM should inform all and sundry that the people of Uganda are, politically, mature people. They are able to disregard lies put out by opportunists and stand on the truth. In the last 45 years, the NRM position is well known. We reject reactionary ideology and stand for progressive ideas. We reject sectarianism as well as parochialism and stand for nationalism. We reject puppetry and stand for the genuine independence of Uganda and other African countries. We reject stagnation of the Ugandan society and stand for its rapid transformation into a modern society. In spite of the initial scarce resources, we have made huge advances in the last 25 years. We now have 8 million children in the primary schools, 1.5 million children in the secondary schools, 120,000 students in the universities and 53,729 in tertiary institutions. In 1986, the comparable figures were: 2.5 million children in the primary schools, 190,000 children in the secondary schools, 5,000 students in the university and 27,205 in tertiary institutions. We only had one university. We now have 28 universities (both public and private). In a period of almost 90 years, between 1894 when the British colonized Uganda and 1986 when the NRM took over Government, we had only 28,000 telephone lines. We now have over 14 million telephone lines. I can continue to bring out the NRM achievements in every sector. However, these examples suffice to highlight this point. The NRM stands for Pan-Africanism, which translates into economic and political integration. We are very happy with the market of 130 million people of the East African Community. We are happy with the COMESA market of over 400 million people. We are also working for the political integration of East Africa together with our partners of Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The massive victory by the NRM in the February 2011 elections, therefore, was a triumph of progress and even revolutionary ideology over reactionary ideology. It was a triumph of Uganda’s patriotism over sectarianism and opportunism. We won overwhelming victory in all the regions of Uganda. Since creation, this is the first time Ugandans have coalesced into such a consensus. I would, therefore, call upon those who have been pushing sectarian ideas and pushing opportunism to join the national consensus instead of being desperate and embarking on disruptive schemes. Those disruptive schemes will be defeated just like the previous opportunistic schemes have been defeated. Uganda is now on the verge of take-off to become a middle income country by 2016. In order for Uganda to accelerate her speed to a middle income status, we need to resolve one issue. Just as you cannot build a house without a foundation (musingyi, oruhazo), you cannot build a modern economy without modern infrastructure. By this, we mean: electricity, roads, the railway, piped water, telephones, ICT network, media, as well as social infrastructure in the form of schools, colleges, health units, etc. The importance of these elements of infrastructure is two fold. Social infrastructure produces healthy, educated and skilled human resource. The economic infrastructure, on the other hand, is very useful for the economy because it lowers the costs of doing business in the economy and, therefore, enterprises become more profitable. This, in turn, attracts more enterprises to Uganda which create more jobs, widens the tax base, etc. The area of telephone infrastructure has been catered for by the private sector as already indicated above. In the area of piped water, at least, all the major towns are properly served now. We need to expand piped water to the trading centres and the villages. Using a Chinese loan, we have built the fibre optic cable for ICT network. The private sector and, to some extent the Government, are handling well the issue of media infrastructure. The Government has long handled the issue of the education infrastructure. We now have 148,720 classrooms, built with permanent materials, compared to 21,959 classrooms in 1986. Similarly, the Government has been handling the issue of health infrastructure. There are now, for instance, 166 Health Centre IVs compared to1986 when there was nothing. It is, therefore, the main cost pushers in the economy that need to be addressed. These are electricity, roads and the railways. These have been badly addressed, not only here in Uganda, but also in other African countries. There is a useful measurement I have been using to highlight the big mistake Africa has been finding itself in. This is kilo watt hour (kWh) per capita. Countries like the USA have got a kWh per capita of 12,500. Uganda, on the other hand, has got a kWh per capita of only 70. In 1986, it was 21 kWh per capita. Many African countries have, similarly, very low kWh per capita, even those that have been peaceful all the time since independence. I blame the technocratic staff for this mistake. I also blame the 6th Parliament for part of this mistake. Since I discovered this mistake, I have pushed for fast movement on this issue. By next year, when Bujagali and other mini-hydro stations are finished, Uganda’s kWh per capita will be 100. By 2016, when Karuma, Ayago and Isimba are ready, our kWh per capita will be 500. To be sure that we do not waste any more time, we are going to use our own money for much of this work. If private capital is available on terms that will ensure low tariffs for consumers and there will be no delays in the execution of projects, then, we shall welcome it. You can see what a big struggle we have to make up for lost time. Using largely our own money, we shall also work on the roads, on the railway, on A’ level free education, university student loans as well as on scientific innovations and research as per our manifesto. To achieve these goals we need discipline and the rule of law. Regarding the current short term problems of increased fuel prices and increased food prices, we are looking at the option of buying in fuel bulk and also the option of approaching the Government of Southern Sudan. I am told that buying in bulk lowers prices. I am also told that fuel in Juba is cheaper. In fact, some of our people from West Nile are already using that fuel, especially diesel. I intend to approach the Government of Southern Sudan to see the possibilities. In the next 3 years, we shall be using our own fuel after the building of the Refinery is finished. We are also analyzing the price of fuel up to Eldoret. Is it all justified? On the issue of food, predictions are showing that this is a temporary problem. We are likely to have a bumper harvest. The prices will normalize. In the short run we are going to encourage micro-irrigation based on individual farms. The Ministry of Finance will encourage the importation of the necessary equipment for micro-irrigation – sprinklers, hoses, etc., or making them here, locally. Farmers can, however, use very simple methods, such as the plastic water bottles. You fill a bottle with water, make a small hole in the bottle and put it next to the plant. The plant will grow very well. We also need to emphasize the use of fertilizers. All these harvests we achieve, we attain without the use of fertilizers – 10 million metric tones of bananas, 4 million bags of coffee, etc. With fertilizers, we are going to produce much more. I am, however, told that fertilizers should be used carefully because they can also spoil the soils. The increased demand for food in the world and the region is good for the farmers of Uganda and for the economy of our country. We, however, need to work out mechanism of stabilizing food prices for the urban-dwellers and salary-earners in towns. All this should be done without interfering with the foundation projects I have talked about above – electricity, roads, the railway, education and health. Our research scientists are struggling with solutions for the banana and coffee wilt. I demand that the scientists put out a programme of action through the Ministry of Agriculture. On the issue of mega-irrigations in Karamoja, the Mount Elgon area, the Rwenzori area, the plan is that the programmes will be handled in the 3rd or 4th year of this Government. Our emphasis, for the first two years, will be on electricity, roads, the railway, scientific research and innovation, A’ level education for free and the student loans for universities. The Minister of Finance is also working on the question of the issue of silos for storage. In all these projects, we are going to use our own money. If we can secure a soft loan from the funding Agencies, we would start on the mega-irrigation schemes soon. On the health, we are continuing to crack down on the theft of drugs from health centres by health workers. In the medium term, we shall look at the question of salaries for doctors and health workers. Again, without interfering with the foundation activities, we will be happy to raise the salaries of health workers and other scientists. I thank all the Ugandans who supported us in the last elections. Continue to support the NRM. My Government will, however, serve all Ugandans as always including those who did not support us. I thank you very much. Kololo - 12th May 2011 Related Image Galleries: President Museveni swears for the forth elective term of Office President Yoweri K. Museveni swears for the forth elective term of Office on 12 May 2011 at Kololo. Home >>> Speech by H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni President-Elect of the Republic of Uganda At the swearing in Speech by H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni President-Elect of the Republic of Uganda At the swearing in Mon, 2011-05-16 First of all, I congratulate all the Ugandans for the peaceful elections held on the 18th of February, 2011 and other elections held since that date. Secondly, I thank the Ugandans for overwhelmingly voting for me with 68.3%, the NRM Members of Parliament with 73%, District Leaders (LCV) with 79% Sub-County leaders (LCIII) with 71%. I also congratulate the opposition parties on the seats they got in Parliament, the District Council seats they got and the Sub-County positions they won. The landslide win by the NRM should inform all and sundry that the people of Uganda are, politically, mature people. They are able to disregard lies put out by opportunists and stand on the truth. In the last 45 years, the NRM position is well known. We reject reactionary ideology and stand for progressive ideas. We reject sectarianism as well as parochialism and stand for nationalism. We reject puppetry and stand for the genuine independence of Uganda and other African countries. We reject stagnation of the Ugandan society and stand for its rapid transformation into a modern society. In spite of the initial scarce resources, we have made huge advances in the last 25 years. We now have 8 million children in the primary schools, 1.5 million children in the secondary schools, 120,000 students in the universities and 53,729 in tertiary institutions. In 1986, the comparable figures were: 2.5 million children in the primary schools, 190,000 children in the secondary schools, 5,000 students in the university and 27,205 in tertiary institutions. We only had one university. We now have 28 universities (both public and private). In a period of almost 90 years, between 1894 when the British colonized Uganda and 1986 when the NRM took over Government, we had only 28,000 telephone lines. We now have over 14 million telephone lines. I can continue to bring out the NRM achievements in every sector. However, these examples suffice to highlight this point. The NRM stands for Pan-Africanism, which translates into economic and political integration. We are very happy with the market of 130 million people of the East African Community. We are happy with the COMESA market of over 400 million people. We are also working for the political integration of East Africa together with our partners of Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The massive victory by the NRM in the February 2011 elections, therefore, was a triumph of progress and even revolutionary ideology over reactionary ideology. It was a triumph of Uganda’s patriotism over sectarianism and opportunism. We won overwhelming victory in all the regions of Uganda. Since creation, this is the first time Ugandans have coalesced into such a consensus. I would, therefore, call upon those who have been pushing sectarian ideas and pushing opportunism to join the national consensus instead of being desperate and embarking on disruptive schemes. Those disruptive schemes will be defeated just like the previous opportunistic schemes have been defeated. Uganda is now on the verge of take-off to become a middle income country by 2016. In order for Uganda to accelerate her speed to a middle income status, we need to resolve one issue. Just as you cannot build a house without a foundation (musingyi, oruhazo), you cannot build a modern economy without modern infrastructure. By this, we mean: electricity, roads, the railway, piped water, telephones, ICT network, media, as well as social infrastructure in the form of schools, colleges, health units, etc. The importance of these elements of infrastructure is two fold. Social infrastructure produces healthy, educated and skilled human resource. The economic infrastructure, on the other hand, is very useful for the economy because it lowers the costs of doing business in the economy and, therefore, enterprises become more profitable. This, in turn, attracts more enterprises to Uganda which create more jobs, widens the tax base, etc. The area of telephone infrastructure has been catered for by the private sector as already indicated above. In the area of piped water, at least, all the major towns are properly served now. We need to expand piped water to the trading centres and the villages. Using a Chinese loan, we have built the fibre optic cable for ICT network. The private sector and, to some extent the Government, are handling well the issue of media infrastructure. The Government has long handled the issue of the education infrastructure. We now have 148,720 classrooms, built with permanent materials, compared to 21,959 classrooms in 1986. Similarly, the Government has been handling the issue of health infrastructure. There are now, for instance, 166 Health Centre IVs compared to1986 when there was nothing. It is, therefore, the main cost pushers in the economy that need to be addressed. These are electricity, roads and the railways. These have been badly addressed, not only here in Uganda, but also in other African countries. There is a useful measurement I have been using to highlight the big mistake Africa has been finding itself in. This is kilo watt hour (kWh) per capita. Countries like the USA have got a kWh per capita of 12,500. Uganda, on the other hand, has got a kWh per capita of only 70. In 1986, it was 21 kWh per capita. Many African countries have, similarly, very low kWh per capita, even those that have been peaceful all the time since independence. I blame the technocratic staff for this mistake. I also blame the 6th Parliament for part of this mistake. Since I discovered this mistake, I have pushed for fast movement on this issue. By next year, when Bujagali and other mini-hydro stations are finished, Uganda’s kWh per capita will be 100. By 2016, when Karuma, Ayago and Isimba are ready, our kWh per capita will be 500. To be sure that we do not waste any more time, we are going to use our own money for much of this work. If private capital is available on terms that will ensure low tariffs for consumers and there will be no delays in the execution of projects, then, we shall welcome it. You can see what a big struggle we have to make up for lost time. Using largely our own money, we shall also work on the roads, on the railway, on A’ level free education, university student loans as well as on scientific innovations and research as per our manifesto. To achieve these goals we need discipline and the rule of law. Regarding the current short term problems of increased fuel prices and increased food prices, we are looking at the option of buying in fuel bulk and also the option of approaching the Government of Southern Sudan. I am told that buying in bulk lowers prices. I am also told that fuel in Juba is cheaper. In fact, some of our people from West Nile are already using that fuel, especially diesel. I intend to approach the Government of Southern Sudan to see the possibilities. In the next 3 years, we shall be using our own fuel after the building of the Refinery is finished. We are also analyzing the price of fuel up to Eldoret. Is it all justified? On the issue of food, predictions are showing that this is a temporary problem. We are likely to have a bumper harvest. The prices will normalize. In the short run we are going to encourage micro-irrigation based on individual farms. The Ministry of Finance will encourage the importation of the necessary equipment for micro-irrigation – sprinklers, hoses, etc., or making them here, locally. Farmers can, however, use very simple methods, such as the plastic water bottles. You fill a bottle with water, make a small hole in the bottle and put it next to the plant. The plant will grow very well. We also need to emphasize the use of fertilizers. All these harvests we achieve, we attain without the use of fertilizers – 10 million metric tones of bananas, 4 million bags of coffee, etc. With fertilizers, we are going to produce much more. I am, however, told that fertilizers should be used carefully because they can also spoil the soils. The increased demand for food in the world and the region is good for the farmers of Uganda and for the economy of our country. We, however, need to work out mechanism of stabilizing food prices for the urban-dwellers and salary-earners in towns. All this should be done without interfering with the foundation projects I have talked about above – electricity, roads, the railway, education and health. Our research scientists are struggling with solutions for the banana and coffee wilt. I demand that the scientists put out a programme of action through the Ministry of Agriculture. On the issue of mega-irrigations in Karamoja, the Mount Elgon area, the Rwenzori area, the plan is that the programmes will be handled in the 3rd or 4th year of this Government. Our emphasis, for the first two years, will be on electricity, roads, the railway, scientific research and innovation, A’ level education for free and the student loans for universities. The Minister of Finance is also working on the question of the issue of silos for storage. In all these projects, we are going to use our own money. If we can secure a soft loan from the funding Agencies, we would start on the mega-irrigation schemes soon. On the health, we are continuing to crack down on the theft of drugs from health centres by health workers. In the medium term, we shall look at the question of salaries for doctors and health workers. Again, without interfering with the foundation activities, we will be happy to raise the salaries of health workers and other scientists. I thank all the Ugandans who supported us in the last elections. Continue to support the NRM. My Government will, however, serve all Ugandans as always including those who did not support us. I thank you very much. Kololo - 12th May 2011 Related Image Galleries: President Museveni swears for the forth elective term of Office President Yoweri K. Museveni swears for the forth elective term of Office on 12 May 2011 at Kololo.
Home >>> Speech by H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni President-Elect of the Republic of Uganda At the swearing in
Speech by H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni President-Elect of the Republic of Uganda At the swearing in
Mon, 2011-05-16
First of all, I congratulate all the Ugandans for the peaceful elections held on the 18th of February, 2011 and other elections held since that date. Secondly, I thank the Ugandans for overwhelmingly voting for me with 68.3%, the NRM Members of Parliament with 73%, District Leaders (LCV) with 79% Sub-County leaders (LCIII) with 71%. I also congratulate the opposition parties on the seats they got in Parliament, the District Council seats they got and the Sub-County positions they won.
The landslide win by the NRM should inform all and sundry that the people of Uganda are, politically, mature people. They are able to disregard lies put out by opportunists and stand on the truth. In the last 45 years, the NRM position is well known. We reject reactionary ideology and stand for progressive ideas. We reject sectarianism as well as parochialism and stand for nationalism. We reject puppetry and stand for the genuine independence of Uganda and other African countries. We reject stagnation of the Ugandan society and stand for its rapid transformation into a modern society. In spite of the initial scarce resources, we have made huge advances in the last 25 years.
We now have 8 million children in the primary schools, 1.5 million children in the secondary schools, 120,000 students in the universities and 53,729 in tertiary institutions. In 1986, the comparable figures were: 2.5 million children in the primary schools, 190,000 children in the secondary schools, 5,000 students in the university and 27,205 in tertiary institutions. We only had one university. We now have 28 universities (both public and private). In a period of almost 90 years, between 1894 when the British colonized Uganda and 1986 when the NRM took over Government, we had only 28,000 telephone lines. We now have over 14 million telephone lines.
I can continue to bring out the NRM achievements in every sector. However, these examples suffice to highlight this point. The NRM stands for Pan-Africanism, which translates into economic and political integration. We are very happy with the market of 130 million people of the East African Community. We are happy with the COMESA market of over 400 million people. We are also working for the political integration of East Africa together with our partners of Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The massive victory by the NRM in the February 2011 elections, therefore, was a triumph of progress and even revolutionary ideology over reactionary ideology.
It was a triumph of Uganda’s patriotism over sectarianism and opportunism. We won overwhelming victory in all the regions of Uganda. Since creation, this is the first time Ugandans have coalesced into such a consensus. I would, therefore, call upon those who have been pushing sectarian ideas and pushing opportunism to join the national consensus instead of being desperate and embarking on disruptive schemes. Those disruptive schemes will be defeated just like the previous opportunistic schemes have been defeated. Uganda is now on the verge of take-off to become a middle income country by 2016. In order for Uganda to accelerate her speed to a middle income status, we need to resolve one issue. Just as you cannot build a house without a foundation (musingyi, oruhazo), you cannot build a modern economy without modern infrastructure. By this, we mean: electricity, roads, the railway, piped water, telephones, ICT network, media, as well as social infrastructure in the form of schools, colleges, health units, etc.
The importance of these elements of infrastructure is two fold. Social infrastructure produces healthy, educated and skilled human resource. The economic infrastructure, on the other hand, is very useful for the economy because it lowers the costs of doing business in the economy and, therefore, enterprises become more profitable. This, in turn, attracts more enterprises to Uganda which create more jobs, widens the tax base, etc. The area of telephone infrastructure has been catered for by the private sector as already indicated above. In the area of piped water, at least, all the major towns are properly served now. We need to expand piped water to the trading centres and the villages. Using a Chinese loan, we have built the fibre optic cable for ICT network. The private sector and, to some extent the Government, are handling well the issue of media infrastructure.
The Government has long handled the issue of the education infrastructure. We now have 148,720 classrooms, built with permanent materials, compared to 21,959 classrooms in 1986. Similarly, the Government has been handling the issue of health infrastructure. There are now, for instance, 166 Health Centre IVs compared to1986 when there was nothing. It is, therefore, the main cost pushers in the economy that need to be addressed. These are electricity, roads and the railways. These have been badly addressed, not only here in Uganda, but also in other African countries.
There is a useful measurement I have been using to highlight the big mistake Africa has been finding itself in. This is kilo watt hour (kWh) per capita. Countries like the USA have got a kWh per capita of 12,500. Uganda, on the other hand, has got a kWh per capita of only 70. In 1986, it was 21 kWh per capita. Many African countries have, similarly, very low kWh per capita, even those that have been peaceful all the time since independence. I blame the technocratic staff for this mistake. I also blame the 6th Parliament for part of this mistake. Since I discovered this mistake, I have pushed for fast movement on this issue. By next year, when Bujagali and other mini-hydro stations are finished, Uganda’s kWh per capita will be 100. By 2016, when Karuma, Ayago and Isimba are ready, our kWh per capita will be 500. To be sure that we do not waste any more time, we are going to use our own money for much of this work. If private capital is available on terms that will ensure low tariffs for consumers and there will be no delays in the execution of projects, then, we shall welcome it. You can see what a big struggle we have to make up for lost time. Using largely our own money, we shall also work on the roads, on the railway, on A’ level free education, university student loans as well as on scientific innovations and research as per our manifesto.
To achieve these goals we need discipline and the rule of law. Regarding the current short term problems of increased fuel prices and increased food prices, we are looking at the option of buying in fuel bulk and also the option of approaching the Government of Southern Sudan. I am told that buying in bulk lowers prices. I am also told that fuel in Juba is cheaper. In fact, some of our people from West Nile are already using that fuel, especially diesel. I intend to approach the Government of Southern Sudan to see the possibilities. In the next 3 years, we shall be using our own fuel after the building of the Refinery is finished. We are also analyzing the price of fuel up to Eldoret. Is it all justified? On the issue of food, predictions are showing that this is a temporary problem. We are likely to have a bumper harvest. The prices will normalize. In the short run we are going to encourage micro-irrigation based on individual farms. The Ministry of Finance will encourage the importation of the necessary equipment for micro-irrigation – sprinklers, hoses, etc., or making them here, locally.
Farmers can, however, use very simple methods, such as the plastic water bottles. You fill a bottle with water, make a small hole in the bottle and put it next to the plant. The plant will grow very well. We also need to emphasize the use of fertilizers. All these harvests we achieve, we attain without the use of fertilizers – 10 million metric tones of bananas, 4 million bags of coffee, etc. With fertilizers, we are going to produce much more. I am, however, told that fertilizers should be used carefully because they can also spoil the soils. The increased demand for food in the world and the region is good for the farmers of Uganda and for the economy of our country. We, however, need to work out mechanism of stabilizing food prices for the urban-dwellers and salary-earners in towns. All this should be done without interfering with the foundation projects I have talked about above – electricity, roads, the railway, education and health.
Our research scientists are struggling with solutions for the banana and coffee wilt. I demand that the scientists put out a programme of action through the Ministry of Agriculture. On the issue of mega-irrigations in Karamoja, the Mount Elgon area, the Rwenzori area, the plan is that the programmes will be handled in the 3rd or 4th year of this Government. Our emphasis, for the first two years, will be on electricity, roads, the railway, scientific research and innovation, A’ level education for free and the student loans for universities. The Minister of Finance is also working on the question of the issue of silos for storage.
In all these projects, we are going to use our own money. If we can secure a soft loan from the funding Agencies, we would start on the mega-irrigation schemes soon. On the health, we are continuing to crack down on the theft of drugs from health centres by health workers. In the medium term, we shall look at the question of salaries for doctors and health workers. Again, without interfering with the foundation activities, we will be happy to raise the salaries of health workers and other scientists. I thank all the Ugandans who supported us in the last elections. Continue to support the NRM. My Government will, however, serve all Ugandans as always including those who did not support us.
I thank you very much.
Kololo - 12th May 2011
Related Image Galleries:
President Museveni swears for the forth elective term of Office
President Yoweri K. Museveni swears for the forth elective term of Office on 12 May 2011 at Kololo.
Speech by H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni President-Elect of the Republic of Uganda At the swearing in
Mon, 2011-05-16
First of all, I congratulate all the Ugandans for the peaceful elections held on the 18th of February, 2011 and other elections held since that date. Secondly, I thank the Ugandans for overwhelmingly voting for me with 68.3%, the NRM Members of Parliament with 73%, District Leaders (LCV) with 79% Sub-County leaders (LCIII) with 71%. I also congratulate the opposition parties on the seats they got in Parliament, the District Council seats they got and the Sub-County positions they won.
The landslide win by the NRM should inform all and sundry that the people of Uganda are, politically, mature people. They are able to disregard lies put out by opportunists and stand on the truth. In the last 45 years, the NRM position is well known. We reject reactionary ideology and stand for progressive ideas. We reject sectarianism as well as parochialism and stand for nationalism. We reject puppetry and stand for the genuine independence of Uganda and other African countries. We reject stagnation of the Ugandan society and stand for its rapid transformation into a modern society. In spite of the initial scarce resources, we have made huge advances in the last 25 years.
We now have 8 million children in the primary schools, 1.5 million children in the secondary schools, 120,000 students in the universities and 53,729 in tertiary institutions. In 1986, the comparable figures were: 2.5 million children in the primary schools, 190,000 children in the secondary schools, 5,000 students in the university and 27,205 in tertiary institutions. We only had one university. We now have 28 universities (both public and private). In a period of almost 90 years, between 1894 when the British colonized Uganda and 1986 when the NRM took over Government, we had only 28,000 telephone lines. We now have over 14 million telephone lines.
I can continue to bring out the NRM achievements in every sector. However, these examples suffice to highlight this point. The NRM stands for Pan-Africanism, which translates into economic and political integration. We are very happy with the market of 130 million people of the East African Community. We are happy with the COMESA market of over 400 million people. We are also working for the political integration of East Africa together with our partners of Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The massive victory by the NRM in the February 2011 elections, therefore, was a triumph of progress and even revolutionary ideology over reactionary ideology.
It was a triumph of Uganda’s patriotism over sectarianism and opportunism. We won overwhelming victory in all the regions of Uganda. Since creation, this is the first time Ugandans have coalesced into such a consensus. I would, therefore, call upon those who have been pushing sectarian ideas and pushing opportunism to join the national consensus instead of being desperate and embarking on disruptive schemes. Those disruptive schemes will be defeated just like the previous opportunistic schemes have been defeated. Uganda is now on the verge of take-off to become a middle income country by 2016. In order for Uganda to accelerate her speed to a middle income status, we need to resolve one issue. Just as you cannot build a house without a foundation (musingyi, oruhazo), you cannot build a modern economy without modern infrastructure. By this, we mean: electricity, roads, the railway, piped water, telephones, ICT network, media, as well as social infrastructure in the form of schools, colleges, health units, etc.
The importance of these elements of infrastructure is two fold. Social infrastructure produces healthy, educated and skilled human resource. The economic infrastructure, on the other hand, is very useful for the economy because it lowers the costs of doing business in the economy and, therefore, enterprises become more profitable. This, in turn, attracts more enterprises to Uganda which create more jobs, widens the tax base, etc. The area of telephone infrastructure has been catered for by the private sector as already indicated above. In the area of piped water, at least, all the major towns are properly served now. We need to expand piped water to the trading centres and the villages. Using a Chinese loan, we have built the fibre optic cable for ICT network. The private sector and, to some extent the Government, are handling well the issue of media infrastructure.
The Government has long handled the issue of the education infrastructure. We now have 148,720 classrooms, built with permanent materials, compared to 21,959 classrooms in 1986. Similarly, the Government has been handling the issue of health infrastructure. There are now, for instance, 166 Health Centre IVs compared to1986 when there was nothing. It is, therefore, the main cost pushers in the economy that need to be addressed. These are electricity, roads and the railways. These have been badly addressed, not only here in Uganda, but also in other African countries.
There is a useful measurement I have been using to highlight the big mistake Africa has been finding itself in. This is kilo watt hour (kWh) per capita. Countries like the USA have got a kWh per capita of 12,500. Uganda, on the other hand, has got a kWh per capita of only 70. In 1986, it was 21 kWh per capita. Many African countries have, similarly, very low kWh per capita, even those that have been peaceful all the time since independence. I blame the technocratic staff for this mistake. I also blame the 6th Parliament for part of this mistake. Since I discovered this mistake, I have pushed for fast movement on this issue. By next year, when Bujagali and other mini-hydro stations are finished, Uganda’s kWh per capita will be 100. By 2016, when Karuma, Ayago and Isimba are ready, our kWh per capita will be 500. To be sure that we do not waste any more time, we are going to use our own money for much of this work. If private capital is available on terms that will ensure low tariffs for consumers and there will be no delays in the execution of projects, then, we shall welcome it. You can see what a big struggle we have to make up for lost time. Using largely our own money, we shall also work on the roads, on the railway, on A’ level free education, university student loans as well as on scientific innovations and research as per our manifesto.
To achieve these goals we need discipline and the rule of law. Regarding the current short term problems of increased fuel prices and increased food prices, we are looking at the option of buying in fuel bulk and also the option of approaching the Government of Southern Sudan. I am told that buying in bulk lowers prices. I am also told that fuel in Juba is cheaper. In fact, some of our people from West Nile are already using that fuel, especially diesel. I intend to approach the Government of Southern Sudan to see the possibilities. In the next 3 years, we shall be using our own fuel after the building of the Refinery is finished. We are also analyzing the price of fuel up to Eldoret. Is it all justified? On the issue of food, predictions are showing that this is a temporary problem. We are likely to have a bumper harvest. The prices will normalize. In the short run we are going to encourage micro-irrigation based on individual farms. The Ministry of Finance will encourage the importation of the necessary equipment for micro-irrigation – sprinklers, hoses, etc., or making them here, locally.
Farmers can, however, use very simple methods, such as the plastic water bottles. You fill a bottle with water, make a small hole in the bottle and put it next to the plant. The plant will grow very well. We also need to emphasize the use of fertilizers. All these harvests we achieve, we attain without the use of fertilizers – 10 million metric tones of bananas, 4 million bags of coffee, etc. With fertilizers, we are going to produce much more. I am, however, told that fertilizers should be used carefully because they can also spoil the soils. The increased demand for food in the world and the region is good for the farmers of Uganda and for the economy of our country. We, however, need to work out mechanism of stabilizing food prices for the urban-dwellers and salary-earners in towns. All this should be done without interfering with the foundation projects I have talked about above – electricity, roads, the railway, education and health.
Our research scientists are struggling with solutions for the banana and coffee wilt. I demand that the scientists put out a programme of action through the Ministry of Agriculture. On the issue of mega-irrigations in Karamoja, the Mount Elgon area, the Rwenzori area, the plan is that the programmes will be handled in the 3rd or 4th year of this Government. Our emphasis, for the first two years, will be on electricity, roads, the railway, scientific research and innovation, A’ level education for free and the student loans for universities. The Minister of Finance is also working on the question of the issue of silos for storage.
In all these projects, we are going to use our own money. If we can secure a soft loan from the funding Agencies, we would start on the mega-irrigation schemes soon. On the health, we are continuing to crack down on the theft of drugs from health centres by health workers. In the medium term, we shall look at the question of salaries for doctors and health workers. Again, without interfering with the foundation activities, we will be happy to raise the salaries of health workers and other scientists. I thank all the Ugandans who supported us in the last elections. Continue to support the NRM. My Government will, however, serve all Ugandans as always including those who did not support us.
I thank you very much.
Kololo - 12th May 2011
Related Image Galleries:
President Museveni swears for the forth elective term of Office
President Yoweri K. Museveni swears for the forth elective term of Office on 12 May 2011 at Kololo.
Prof Joe Oloka-Onyango: Uganda - What needs undoing
Friday, 6 May 2011
Prof Joe Oloka-Onyango: Uganda - What needs undoing
Written by Joe Oloka-Onyango
Wednesday, 04 May 2011 18:56
No democracy relies so much on the military
Makerere University law professor, Joe Oloka-Onyango, made a presentation at the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda (IRCU) post-election 2011 conference in Kampala on April 27, 2011.
President Museveni, who closed the conference, was very critical of Prof Oloka’s presentation, accusing him of poisoning the minds of “our children”.
Below, the Observer Newspaper reproduced a slightly edited version of the paper that got Museveni so worked up.
Today my first message to you is: Pray for Uganda!
But as you pray, I urge you not only to think of matters spiritual. Rather, I ask you to think of religion today as a means through which we can correct the many ailments that afflict us, and for you to go back to the manner in which the founders of the world’s great religions used their power: not as a means to guarantee that their flock grow in number, but as a mechanism for enlightenment and caution.
Today I want to urge you to face the main challenges of governance confronting the country and to step out from your mosques, churches and temples and confront the evils we are facing head on. In other words, as you pray, please keep one eye open!
I have been asked to examine the key governance challenges we face in Uganda today. I want to focus on what needs to be undone. In other words, what things do we need to rid ourselves of in order to improve the state of governance as we approach the swearing-in ceremony of a new/old government and move into the next five years of NRM rule? In order to answer that question, it is necessary for us to take a small step back in history.
When 42-year-old guerilla leader Yoweri Kaguta Museveni emerged from the five-year bush war to claim the presidency of Uganda in 1986, he was proclaimed as a great redeemer. Although there were many questions as to whether he had the credentials to lead such a decimated and demoralized population out of the doldrums, there can be little doubt that Uganda has done fairly well under his steerage.
It is not for me to sing the praises of the government, but even the most ardent critic must admit that Uganda is no longer “the Sick Man of Africa” that it used to be in the 1980s. Twenty five years later, Museveni remains at the helm of Ugandan politics, and on February 18, 2011, he received yet another endorsement in an election that extends his term in power until 2016.
He has already entered the record books as East Africa’s longest-serving leader, outstripping both the late Julius Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenyan ex-President Daniel arap Moi. By the end of this 6th term, Museveni will be 72 years old, and at 30 years in power will join the ranks of Africa’s longest, among them, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Angolan president Eduardo dos Santos and the beleaguered Muammar el Gaddafi.
But it will also be the time to ask whether Museveni’s legacy will be that of the former Tanzanian president, who left office still loved and revered, or a figure of tragedy and hatred like Moi? Indeed, as North Africa witnesses the nine-pin like collapse of long-term dictatorships starting with Tunisia and spreading like wildfire, it is necessary to inquire how it is that Museveni won the February 18 election, and what lessons this has for political struggle and freedom in Uganda.
Drawing on Libya for comparison is particularly apt since Museveni has long been an ally of Muammar Abu Minyar al Gaddafi. You will recall that on one of many trips to Kampala, the eccentric leader of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya urged Museveni to stay in office for life, arguing that revolutionaries are not like company Managing Directors.
The former do not retire from office! It is a lesson Museveni took to heart, removing presidential term limits from the constitution in 2005, and setting himself well on the way to a de facto life presidency.
But before we look to the future, we need to return to the past, especially to understand the recent election. What explains Museveni’s February victory, especially given that while largely predicted, the margin by which he won (68% of the presidential vote and 75% for his National Resistance Movement in the parliamentary poll) stunned many!
We need to compare this margin with the three previous elections in 1996 (when he won with 75%), in 2001 (69%) and in 2006 (59%). According to the pundits who filled the radio airwaves before the poll, while still popular and dominant and thus likely to win, the downward trend would continue. Some even predicted that there would be a run-off because the 50.1% margin would not be scaled in the first round. The other issue of surprise was the relative calm and lack of violence that attended the election.
Most foreign observers, from the European Union to the US government, described the vote as generally peaceful, free of bloodshed and largely a “free and genuine” expression of the wishes of the Ugandan people. It was only the African Union (AU) that declined outright to describe the poll as “free and fair”.
The local media described it as the “most boring” poll in recent history, lacking as it did much of the drama, intrigue and confrontation that Ugandans had become accustomed to. It is thus not surprising that Museveni’s rap ditty, ’Give Me My Stick/You Want Another Rap?’ garnered more attention than the substantive issues at stake.
Not yet multi-party
To fully comprehend the outcome of Uganda’s recent poll, it is necessary to understand a number of basic facts. The first is that Uganda is yet to become a functioning multiparty democracy. For the first nineteen years of Museveni rule, we operated under a “no-party” or “movement” system of government, which was little better than a single-party state.
Under that system, government and party institutions overlapped right from the lowest level (resistance or local councils) through to Parliament. Indeed, in many respects Museveni took a leaf from Gaddafi’s popular councils, creating these LCs as supposedly representative of grassroots democracy, but essentially a cover for single-party dominance.
Today, many of the no-party structures remain intact and operative. They function as the main conduits of political mobilisation and for the channeling of state resources, buttressed by a massive local bureaucracy of government agents and spies.
These include the Local Councils (especially 1 and 2), and although they may appear insignificant, they in fact play a crucial role in governance in the country. Indeed, that system remains intact, and only this week we were advised by the Electoral Commission that elections for the lower levels of local government would be postponed, yet again.
It is clear that not only is the postponement illegal, it also reflects a reluctance on the part of the ruling party to make the final necessary transition from the movement to a multi-party political system of governance.
Power of incumbency
We also need to recall that in most countries it is very difficult to remove incumbent governments through an electoral process. In the history of African electoral democracy, only a handful of ruling parties have lost a poll.
In Uganda, the fact of incumbency guaranteed President Museveni unfettered access to state coffers, such that the NRM reportedly spent $350 million in the campaign. Whether or not this is true, we have not yet received a proper accounting of how much the NRM [or indeed any other party] spent and from where they received this money; already, this means that we are being held hostage to the lack of transparency and the underhand nature of politics that we thought we had long left behind.
Indeed, the enduring image of the past several months has been that of the President handing out brown envelopes stashed with cash for various women, youth and other types of civic groupings. I don’t know if religious leaders were also beneficiaries of this largesse. If you were, then you must acknowledge that you have become part of the problem. For in those envelopes lies a key aspect of the problem: the phenomenon of institutionalized corruption that has become the hallmark of this regime.
Militarised context
The other reason for Museveni’s victory lies in the highly-militarised context within which politics and governance in Uganda is executed. We know that after five years of civil war (1981 to 1986), and twenty-plus years of insurgency in the north of the country, Uganda has virtually never been free from conflict. Unsurprisingly, the idea of peace and security occupy a very significant position within the national psyche.
For older Ugandans there is some fear of a reversion to earlier more chaotic times, while for the younger generation who have only experienced Museveni, the claim that he has restored peace has a particular resonance. Ironically, both groups also fear that if Museveni lost an election, he would never accept the result, and instead would either return to the bush or cause such great instability that it is not worth it to even think about an alternative candidate.
This explains what to many is the most surprising outcome of the election: Museveni’s victory in northern Uganda despite facing two sons-of-the-soil in ex-diplomat Olara Otunnu and the youthful Norbert Mao.
I believe that the looming presence of the military also explains why the turnout for the election at 59% was much lower than any of the previous three polls, where figures were closer to 70%. Many people simply stayed at home, partly out of apathy, but more on account of the fact that the streets of Kampala and other parts of the country were swamped with military personnel.
Any visitor to Uganda over the election period would not be wrong to question whether the country was not a military dictatorship. Moreover, and unfortunately, the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) is more akin to the army in Libya than that it is in Egypt.
UPDF is not well known for exercising restraint when dealing with civilian insurrection or politically-motivated opposition. Indeed, when the red berets and the green uniforms come out on the streets you know that there will be correspondingly higher casualties. That is why we should condemn the increased militarisation of the political context.
It is why we should demand that instead of spending on jets, tear gas and APCs, we need more [money] to be spent on roads, hospitals and our UPE schools.
No opposition parties
Museveni’s performance in the north reflects the other side to the story, and that is the fact that Museveni is only as good as the opposition he faces. The dismal performance of the opposition is attributable to a host of factors, not least of which is the fact that there are really no opposition parties in Uganda.
Rather, there are only opposition personalities epitomized by three-time presidential contender, Col. (rtd) Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) who have constructed around themselves weak or non-existent party structures that only come to life in the run up to the election.
During the election Uganda’s opposition seemed to lack a firm ideological position, and while the death of ideology is an ailment affecting the ruling NRM too, its absence among the opposition has proven particularly harmful as there is a lack of a central organizing message around which the opposition can translate obvious disgust and support against Museveni into electoral victory.
Thus, at the start of the election season, the opposition wavered between a united front against Museveni or a boycott, citing the bias of the Electoral Commission and the unlevel playing field.
As we are all aware, neither option was adopted, and at the end of the day all major opposition parties decided to field candidates in both the presidential and parliamentary elections, while decrying the inequality in the contest.
It is important and ironic to note that the opposition may have found a more united voice after the election. This is in the Walk-to-Work (W2W) protests. The fact that the government has failed to find a suitable response to this opposition unity speaks volumes of the foundations on which the February 18 victory rest.
Most importantly, the W2W protests demonstrate that Ugandans can be mobilized around issues as opposed to the mobilization of fear (“we brought you peace”), the mobilization of money (brown envelopes), or the mobilization of elite benefits (the promise of new ministries and the creation of more unviable districts).
At the end of the day, while President Museveni’s victory is not much of a surprise, and in the short run ensures the continued charade of economic and political stability that has characterized the last two decades, I would like to suggest that it portends considerable apprehension for the future of the country.
Museveni character
While the President has dismissed comparisons with the fallen dictators of north Africa, there are indeed many parallels. First of all, the state in Uganda has assumed what can only be described as a ‘Musevenist’ character, such that an election such as the recent one can only be an exercise in endorsement of the incumbent, complete with his iconized symbolic hat.
This is because the leadership of the state was afflicted with the disease I have described as ‘stayism’ for which the antidote has never been an election. Secondly, the Ugandan state has also devolved to a situation in which there is little to distinguish between the personal and the political, and where it is increasingly being marked by the growth of what can only be described as family or personal rule.
Thirdly, we are in very real danger of beginning an era of dynastic politics. While President Museveni has only one son (in comparison to Gaddafi’s seven), Muhoozi Kainerugaba is clearly being groomed for greater things. Thus, he has taken charge of the Presidential Guard Brigade, the elite force designed to guarantee his father’s personal security, and he recently wrote a book about the bush war, to burnish his credentials as an intellectual-cum-soldier able to fit into his father’s rather large shoes.
This is clearly the same path that Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi pursued, only to find themselves thwarted by the movement of the people. While it may be true that revolutionaries don’t retire, if there is no other lesson of the recent northern African upheavals, it is that revolutionaries can be forced to resign. It is all simply a matter of time.
It is important for us to underscore a number of lessons [from North Africa] that cannot be ignored:
1. Regardless of the size of the military apparatus one constructs, even the most powerful of regimes can be brought down;
2. Resistance and reaction to poor governance can come from anywhere, even from those who are weakest or most marginalized; it is not necessarily the elite or opposition political forces who lead movements for change, and
3. The terrorism of hunger is much more dangerous than the terrorism of so-called terrorists.
Finally, given all that we have seen above, how do we go about undoing the political damage and rebuilding Uganda’s democracy?
1. We need to begin by undoing the tendency towards political monopoly, and to tackle the desire to absolutely dominate the political arena to the exclusion of any contending force, and particularly the burning desire to try to eliminate all forms of opposition to the existing system of governance. In this regard we need to undo unlimited presidential terms and end the phenomenon of longevity in office;
2. We need to force the ruling party to accept that opposition in a multiparty system is a fact of life; the sooner the NRM learns to live with it the better; it thus needs to adapt its methods of response from coercion and abuse, to dialogue and compromise.
We need to undo the detention-without-trial of political opponents like Besigye and Mao and of all the other political activists who have been detained as a result of the W2W strikes, and of earlier events such as the September 2009 (pro-Kabaka) uprising.
3. We need to undo the links between the state and the ruling (NRM) party, first by undertaking a full audit of where and how the NRM raised the resources to finance the last election and secondly through establishing a permanent Political Party Oversight Commission made up of civil society actors, academicians, peasants, religious leaders, and other individuals and groups from all walks of life, with the goal of ensuring that all political parties adhere to the constitution and work towards the expansion of democratic space, rather than its contraction.
4. We need to undo the legal manipulation and the misuse and abuse of law and of the constitution in order to achieve sectarian political objectives. In particular, we need to condemn and combat the constant shifting of the goalposts when the existing ones do not suit the achievement of a particular political objective. We also need to undo the infrastructure of intolerance and exclusion that is manifest in the following laws:
a. The Institution of Cultural and Traditional Leaders Bill;
b. The NGO Act, HIV/AIDS Act, The Equal Opportunities Commission Act, The Anti-Homosexuality Bill, etc.
5. We need to undo the use of coercive (particularly militaristic) methods to achieve political objectives, of which we have seen numerous examples, culminating with the W2W shootings last week.
There is no other country in the world that lays claim to being a democracy which so extensively relies on the military. We are fed up of the notoriety of the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI) and of para-military shadow militias like the Black Mamba; the PGB and the many Generals who have invaded political life. We need to remove the UPDF from directly involving itself in politics as is normally the case in a functioning multiparty system.
6. We need to undo the hypocrisy that claims the high moral ground when we are mired in CORRUPTION, a corruption which has become institutionalized and ‘normal’, and which begins and ends in state house.
7. We need to stop ignoring the youth and treating them like they are the ‘leaders of tomorrow’ or else they will take up arms against us today.
8. We need to undo the monopoly of political power that is exercised only by political actors. All of us have to become politicians; hence while the President’s call for talks with the opposition is welcome, it cannot be a discussion only between the NRM and opposition parties; we also want to be heard and to make sure that no deals are made behind our backs.
Hence, there is a need for a national convention of all civil and social groupings to decide on the future course of the country.
Ladies and gentlemen, we need to stop being complacent about our country. We will wake up and find it gone!
The author is professor of law at Makerere University and head of the Human Rights Peace Centre (HURIPEC).
Prof Joe Oloka-Onyango: Uganda - What needs undoing
Written by Joe Oloka-Onyango
Wednesday, 04 May 2011 18:56
No democracy relies so much on the military
Makerere University law professor, Joe Oloka-Onyango, made a presentation at the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda (IRCU) post-election 2011 conference in Kampala on April 27, 2011.
President Museveni, who closed the conference, was very critical of Prof Oloka’s presentation, accusing him of poisoning the minds of “our children”.
Below, the Observer Newspaper reproduced a slightly edited version of the paper that got Museveni so worked up.
Today my first message to you is: Pray for Uganda!
But as you pray, I urge you not only to think of matters spiritual. Rather, I ask you to think of religion today as a means through which we can correct the many ailments that afflict us, and for you to go back to the manner in which the founders of the world’s great religions used their power: not as a means to guarantee that their flock grow in number, but as a mechanism for enlightenment and caution.
Today I want to urge you to face the main challenges of governance confronting the country and to step out from your mosques, churches and temples and confront the evils we are facing head on. In other words, as you pray, please keep one eye open!
I have been asked to examine the key governance challenges we face in Uganda today. I want to focus on what needs to be undone. In other words, what things do we need to rid ourselves of in order to improve the state of governance as we approach the swearing-in ceremony of a new/old government and move into the next five years of NRM rule? In order to answer that question, it is necessary for us to take a small step back in history.
When 42-year-old guerilla leader Yoweri Kaguta Museveni emerged from the five-year bush war to claim the presidency of Uganda in 1986, he was proclaimed as a great redeemer. Although there were many questions as to whether he had the credentials to lead such a decimated and demoralized population out of the doldrums, there can be little doubt that Uganda has done fairly well under his steerage.
It is not for me to sing the praises of the government, but even the most ardent critic must admit that Uganda is no longer “the Sick Man of Africa” that it used to be in the 1980s. Twenty five years later, Museveni remains at the helm of Ugandan politics, and on February 18, 2011, he received yet another endorsement in an election that extends his term in power until 2016.
He has already entered the record books as East Africa’s longest-serving leader, outstripping both the late Julius Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenyan ex-President Daniel arap Moi. By the end of this 6th term, Museveni will be 72 years old, and at 30 years in power will join the ranks of Africa’s longest, among them, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Angolan president Eduardo dos Santos and the beleaguered Muammar el Gaddafi.
But it will also be the time to ask whether Museveni’s legacy will be that of the former Tanzanian president, who left office still loved and revered, or a figure of tragedy and hatred like Moi? Indeed, as North Africa witnesses the nine-pin like collapse of long-term dictatorships starting with Tunisia and spreading like wildfire, it is necessary to inquire how it is that Museveni won the February 18 election, and what lessons this has for political struggle and freedom in Uganda.
Drawing on Libya for comparison is particularly apt since Museveni has long been an ally of Muammar Abu Minyar al Gaddafi. You will recall that on one of many trips to Kampala, the eccentric leader of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya urged Museveni to stay in office for life, arguing that revolutionaries are not like company Managing Directors.
The former do not retire from office! It is a lesson Museveni took to heart, removing presidential term limits from the constitution in 2005, and setting himself well on the way to a de facto life presidency.
But before we look to the future, we need to return to the past, especially to understand the recent election. What explains Museveni’s February victory, especially given that while largely predicted, the margin by which he won (68% of the presidential vote and 75% for his National Resistance Movement in the parliamentary poll) stunned many!
We need to compare this margin with the three previous elections in 1996 (when he won with 75%), in 2001 (69%) and in 2006 (59%). According to the pundits who filled the radio airwaves before the poll, while still popular and dominant and thus likely to win, the downward trend would continue. Some even predicted that there would be a run-off because the 50.1% margin would not be scaled in the first round. The other issue of surprise was the relative calm and lack of violence that attended the election.
Most foreign observers, from the European Union to the US government, described the vote as generally peaceful, free of bloodshed and largely a “free and genuine” expression of the wishes of the Ugandan people. It was only the African Union (AU) that declined outright to describe the poll as “free and fair”.
The local media described it as the “most boring” poll in recent history, lacking as it did much of the drama, intrigue and confrontation that Ugandans had become accustomed to. It is thus not surprising that Museveni’s rap ditty, ’Give Me My Stick/You Want Another Rap?’ garnered more attention than the substantive issues at stake.
Not yet multi-party
To fully comprehend the outcome of Uganda’s recent poll, it is necessary to understand a number of basic facts. The first is that Uganda is yet to become a functioning multiparty democracy. For the first nineteen years of Museveni rule, we operated under a “no-party” or “movement” system of government, which was little better than a single-party state.
Under that system, government and party institutions overlapped right from the lowest level (resistance or local councils) through to Parliament. Indeed, in many respects Museveni took a leaf from Gaddafi’s popular councils, creating these LCs as supposedly representative of grassroots democracy, but essentially a cover for single-party dominance.
Today, many of the no-party structures remain intact and operative. They function as the main conduits of political mobilisation and for the channeling of state resources, buttressed by a massive local bureaucracy of government agents and spies.
These include the Local Councils (especially 1 and 2), and although they may appear insignificant, they in fact play a crucial role in governance in the country. Indeed, that system remains intact, and only this week we were advised by the Electoral Commission that elections for the lower levels of local government would be postponed, yet again.
It is clear that not only is the postponement illegal, it also reflects a reluctance on the part of the ruling party to make the final necessary transition from the movement to a multi-party political system of governance.
Power of incumbency
We also need to recall that in most countries it is very difficult to remove incumbent governments through an electoral process. In the history of African electoral democracy, only a handful of ruling parties have lost a poll.
In Uganda, the fact of incumbency guaranteed President Museveni unfettered access to state coffers, such that the NRM reportedly spent $350 million in the campaign. Whether or not this is true, we have not yet received a proper accounting of how much the NRM [or indeed any other party] spent and from where they received this money; already, this means that we are being held hostage to the lack of transparency and the underhand nature of politics that we thought we had long left behind.
Indeed, the enduring image of the past several months has been that of the President handing out brown envelopes stashed with cash for various women, youth and other types of civic groupings. I don’t know if religious leaders were also beneficiaries of this largesse. If you were, then you must acknowledge that you have become part of the problem. For in those envelopes lies a key aspect of the problem: the phenomenon of institutionalized corruption that has become the hallmark of this regime.
Militarised context
The other reason for Museveni’s victory lies in the highly-militarised context within which politics and governance in Uganda is executed. We know that after five years of civil war (1981 to 1986), and twenty-plus years of insurgency in the north of the country, Uganda has virtually never been free from conflict. Unsurprisingly, the idea of peace and security occupy a very significant position within the national psyche.
For older Ugandans there is some fear of a reversion to earlier more chaotic times, while for the younger generation who have only experienced Museveni, the claim that he has restored peace has a particular resonance. Ironically, both groups also fear that if Museveni lost an election, he would never accept the result, and instead would either return to the bush or cause such great instability that it is not worth it to even think about an alternative candidate.
This explains what to many is the most surprising outcome of the election: Museveni’s victory in northern Uganda despite facing two sons-of-the-soil in ex-diplomat Olara Otunnu and the youthful Norbert Mao.
I believe that the looming presence of the military also explains why the turnout for the election at 59% was much lower than any of the previous three polls, where figures were closer to 70%. Many people simply stayed at home, partly out of apathy, but more on account of the fact that the streets of Kampala and other parts of the country were swamped with military personnel.
Any visitor to Uganda over the election period would not be wrong to question whether the country was not a military dictatorship. Moreover, and unfortunately, the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) is more akin to the army in Libya than that it is in Egypt.
UPDF is not well known for exercising restraint when dealing with civilian insurrection or politically-motivated opposition. Indeed, when the red berets and the green uniforms come out on the streets you know that there will be correspondingly higher casualties. That is why we should condemn the increased militarisation of the political context.
It is why we should demand that instead of spending on jets, tear gas and APCs, we need more [money] to be spent on roads, hospitals and our UPE schools.
No opposition parties
Museveni’s performance in the north reflects the other side to the story, and that is the fact that Museveni is only as good as the opposition he faces. The dismal performance of the opposition is attributable to a host of factors, not least of which is the fact that there are really no opposition parties in Uganda.
Rather, there are only opposition personalities epitomized by three-time presidential contender, Col. (rtd) Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) who have constructed around themselves weak or non-existent party structures that only come to life in the run up to the election.
During the election Uganda’s opposition seemed to lack a firm ideological position, and while the death of ideology is an ailment affecting the ruling NRM too, its absence among the opposition has proven particularly harmful as there is a lack of a central organizing message around which the opposition can translate obvious disgust and support against Museveni into electoral victory.
Thus, at the start of the election season, the opposition wavered between a united front against Museveni or a boycott, citing the bias of the Electoral Commission and the unlevel playing field.
As we are all aware, neither option was adopted, and at the end of the day all major opposition parties decided to field candidates in both the presidential and parliamentary elections, while decrying the inequality in the contest.
It is important and ironic to note that the opposition may have found a more united voice after the election. This is in the Walk-to-Work (W2W) protests. The fact that the government has failed to find a suitable response to this opposition unity speaks volumes of the foundations on which the February 18 victory rest.
Most importantly, the W2W protests demonstrate that Ugandans can be mobilized around issues as opposed to the mobilization of fear (“we brought you peace”), the mobilization of money (brown envelopes), or the mobilization of elite benefits (the promise of new ministries and the creation of more unviable districts).
At the end of the day, while President Museveni’s victory is not much of a surprise, and in the short run ensures the continued charade of economic and political stability that has characterized the last two decades, I would like to suggest that it portends considerable apprehension for the future of the country.
Museveni character
While the President has dismissed comparisons with the fallen dictators of north Africa, there are indeed many parallels. First of all, the state in Uganda has assumed what can only be described as a ‘Musevenist’ character, such that an election such as the recent one can only be an exercise in endorsement of the incumbent, complete with his iconized symbolic hat.
This is because the leadership of the state was afflicted with the disease I have described as ‘stayism’ for which the antidote has never been an election. Secondly, the Ugandan state has also devolved to a situation in which there is little to distinguish between the personal and the political, and where it is increasingly being marked by the growth of what can only be described as family or personal rule.
Thirdly, we are in very real danger of beginning an era of dynastic politics. While President Museveni has only one son (in comparison to Gaddafi’s seven), Muhoozi Kainerugaba is clearly being groomed for greater things. Thus, he has taken charge of the Presidential Guard Brigade, the elite force designed to guarantee his father’s personal security, and he recently wrote a book about the bush war, to burnish his credentials as an intellectual-cum-soldier able to fit into his father’s rather large shoes.
This is clearly the same path that Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi pursued, only to find themselves thwarted by the movement of the people. While it may be true that revolutionaries don’t retire, if there is no other lesson of the recent northern African upheavals, it is that revolutionaries can be forced to resign. It is all simply a matter of time.
It is important for us to underscore a number of lessons [from North Africa] that cannot be ignored:
1. Regardless of the size of the military apparatus one constructs, even the most powerful of regimes can be brought down;
2. Resistance and reaction to poor governance can come from anywhere, even from those who are weakest or most marginalized; it is not necessarily the elite or opposition political forces who lead movements for change, and
3. The terrorism of hunger is much more dangerous than the terrorism of so-called terrorists.
Finally, given all that we have seen above, how do we go about undoing the political damage and rebuilding Uganda’s democracy?
1. We need to begin by undoing the tendency towards political monopoly, and to tackle the desire to absolutely dominate the political arena to the exclusion of any contending force, and particularly the burning desire to try to eliminate all forms of opposition to the existing system of governance. In this regard we need to undo unlimited presidential terms and end the phenomenon of longevity in office;
2. We need to force the ruling party to accept that opposition in a multiparty system is a fact of life; the sooner the NRM learns to live with it the better; it thus needs to adapt its methods of response from coercion and abuse, to dialogue and compromise.
We need to undo the detention-without-trial of political opponents like Besigye and Mao and of all the other political activists who have been detained as a result of the W2W strikes, and of earlier events such as the September 2009 (pro-Kabaka) uprising.
3. We need to undo the links between the state and the ruling (NRM) party, first by undertaking a full audit of where and how the NRM raised the resources to finance the last election and secondly through establishing a permanent Political Party Oversight Commission made up of civil society actors, academicians, peasants, religious leaders, and other individuals and groups from all walks of life, with the goal of ensuring that all political parties adhere to the constitution and work towards the expansion of democratic space, rather than its contraction.
4. We need to undo the legal manipulation and the misuse and abuse of law and of the constitution in order to achieve sectarian political objectives. In particular, we need to condemn and combat the constant shifting of the goalposts when the existing ones do not suit the achievement of a particular political objective. We also need to undo the infrastructure of intolerance and exclusion that is manifest in the following laws:
a. The Institution of Cultural and Traditional Leaders Bill;
b. The NGO Act, HIV/AIDS Act, The Equal Opportunities Commission Act, The Anti-Homosexuality Bill, etc.
5. We need to undo the use of coercive (particularly militaristic) methods to achieve political objectives, of which we have seen numerous examples, culminating with the W2W shootings last week.
There is no other country in the world that lays claim to being a democracy which so extensively relies on the military. We are fed up of the notoriety of the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI) and of para-military shadow militias like the Black Mamba; the PGB and the many Generals who have invaded political life. We need to remove the UPDF from directly involving itself in politics as is normally the case in a functioning multiparty system.
6. We need to undo the hypocrisy that claims the high moral ground when we are mired in CORRUPTION, a corruption which has become institutionalized and ‘normal’, and which begins and ends in state house.
7. We need to stop ignoring the youth and treating them like they are the ‘leaders of tomorrow’ or else they will take up arms against us today.
8. We need to undo the monopoly of political power that is exercised only by political actors. All of us have to become politicians; hence while the President’s call for talks with the opposition is welcome, it cannot be a discussion only between the NRM and opposition parties; we also want to be heard and to make sure that no deals are made behind our backs.
Hence, there is a need for a national convention of all civil and social groupings to decide on the future course of the country.
Ladies and gentlemen, we need to stop being complacent about our country. We will wake up and find it gone!
The author is professor of law at Makerere University and head of the Human Rights Peace Centre (HURIPEC).
Uganda, Jan 5: Victims of Yoweri Museveni’s reign of terror - (May they RIP)
Crime Against Humanity Update: 03/29/2006 18:41:00
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE
•Olara on Genocide in N. Uganda Author Olara Otunnu
•NOTES ON CONCEALMENT OF GENOCIDE IN UGANDA Author late Dr. A.M Obote (RIP )
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Uganda, Jan 5: Victims of Yoweri Museveni’s reign of terror - (May they RIP)
•1. Brig. Perino Okoya, commander of Second Infantry Brigade, 1970. Personally shot dead by GSU intelligence officer Yoweri Museveni.
2. Nicholas Stroh, American journalist, 1971. Murdered by Lt. Silver Tibahika on orders of Museveni, for investigating FRONASA’s murder of Acholi and Langi army officers.
3. Robert Siedle, Makerere University lecturer, 1971. Murdered by Lt. Silver Tibahika on orders of Museveni, for investigating FRONASA’s murder of Acholi and Langi army officers.
4. James Bwogi, director of Uganda Television, 1971. Murdered by FRONASA agents to tarnish image of President Idi Amin.
5. Michael Kabali Kaggwa, president of Uganda Industrial Court , 1971. Murdered by FRONASA agents and burnt in his car, to turn Baganda against Amin.
6. Father Clement Kiggundu, Roman Catholic priest and former editor of Muuno newspaper, 1971. Dragged from altar during Mass to turn Baganda and Catholics against Amin.
7. Raiti Omongin, first leader of FRONASA, 1972. Personally shot in the mouth by Museveni during a morning parade in Tabora, after Museveni’s claim to FRONASA leadership was challenged.
8. Ali Picho Owiny, former GSU intelligence officer and colleague of Museveni, 1972. Murdered during the attack on Mbarara by Museveni because of his habit of humiliating Museveni in the office. The murder was blamed on Amin’s soldiers.
9. Valerino Rwaheru, comrade in arms of Museveni, 1972. Killed by Museveni to eliminate challenge to his leadership of FRONASA.
10. William a.k.a “Black” Mwesigwa, comrade in arms of Museveni, 1972. Murdered during invastion of Mbarara, to be blamed on Amin’s troops.
11. Basil Kiiza Bataringaya, former minister of Internal Affairs, 1972. Murdered by FRONASA agents and thrown into Rwizi river in Mbarara.
12. Erifazi Laki, county chief of Rwampara, 1972. Killed by FRONASA agents on orders of Museveni, because as a former GSU intelligence officer Laki possibly knew of Museveni’s hand in murdering Brig. Okoya or was a threat to Museveni’s ambitions. The private detective who in 2001 undertook to investigate Laki’s murder was poisoned on orders of Museveni.
13. Patrick Ruhinda, lawyer, 1972. Murdered by FRONASA to turn Ankole against Amin.
14. Benedicto Kiwanuka, president general of DP and Chief Justice, 1972. Abducted from the High Court buildings and shot dead by FRONASA agents near Bombo Road , Wandegeya, to tarnish Amin’s image. The abduction car was driven by a Musoga FRONASA man, Capt. Kaganda.
15. Frank Kalimuzo, vice chancellor of Makerere University , 1972. Murdered by FRONASA agents, to cause fear in Uganda ’s civil service and academic circles. The story of Kalimuzo’s death given by Kintu Musoke had many inconsistencies.
16. John Kakonge, secretary general of Uganda People’s Congress, 1972. Murdered to tarnish Amin’s image.
17. James Karuhanga, comrade in arms of Museveni, 1973. Shot dead by Museveni and blamed on Amin’s troops.
18. Hope Rwaheru, wife of Museveni and sister of Valeriano Rwaheru, 1973. Mother of Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, reportedly strangled by Museveni in Dar es Salaam .
19. Lt. Col. Michael Ondoga, minister of Foreign Affairs, 1974. Kidnapped and murdered by FRONASA agents led by Kahinda Otafiire and body thrown into River Nile.
20. Martin Mwesiga, comrade in arms of Museveni, 1974. Shot dead by Museveni after he witnessed shooting of Omongin.
21. Edith Bataringaya, wife of Basil Bataringaya, 1975. Burnt alive by FRONASA agents in order to discredit Amin.
22. Theresa Nanziri Bukenya, warden of Africa girls’ Hall at Makerere University , 1976. Killed personally by Museveni, by slitting open her stomach when she was eight months pregnant, in order to create more hatred for Amin among Ugandans.
23. Jimmy Parma, photographer, Voice of Uganda, 1976. Murdered by FRONASA for taking photographs of body of Israeli hostage Dora Bloch after Entebbe raid.
24. Esther Chesire, Kenyan student at Makerere University , 1976. Kidnapped by State Research agents working for Museveni’s FRONASA at Entebbe International Airport , in order to stir up hostility between Uganda and Kenya following Israeli attack on Entebbe .
25. Sally Githere, Kenyan student at Makerere University , 1976. Kidnapped by State Research agents working for Museveni’s FRONASA at Entebbe International Airport , in order to stir up hostility between Uganda and Kenya following Israeli attack on Entebbe .
26. Lt. Col. Sarapio Kakuhikire, army officer, 1977. Abducted and killed by FRONASA agents outside main Kampala Post Office in order to discredit Amin.
27. Dr. Jack Barlow, dentist opponents at Mulago Hospital , 1979. Shot dead in Kampala . Barlow was one of several doctors and senior civil servants murdered on orders of Defence Minister Yoweri Museveni to create an atmosphere of lawlessness in Uganda and show that President Godfrey Binaisa had failed to govern Uganda . Killers said they had been sent for his life, not his money or property.
28. Dr. Stephen Obache, doctor at Mulago hospital, 1979. Shot dead in Kampala . He was one of several doctors and senior civil servants murdered on orders of Defence Minister Yoweri Museveni to create an atmosphere of lawlessness in Uganda and show that President Godfrey Binaisa had failed to govern Uganda .
29. Dr. Joseph Kamulegeya, doctor for Kampala City Council, 1979. Shot dead in Kampala . He was one of several doctors and senior civil servants murdered on orders of Defence Minister Yoweri Museveni to create an atmosphere of lawlessness in Uganda and show that President Godfrey Binaisa had failed to govern Uganda .
30. Dr. Mitchell Bagenda, doctor at Mulago Hospital , 1979. Shot dead in his home at his home in Kampala . He was one of several doctors and senior civil servants murdered on orders of Defence Minister Yoweri Museveni to create an atmosphere of lawlessness in Uganda and show that President Godfrey Binaisa had failed to govern Uganda .
31. Lt. Colonel John Ruhinda, UNLA officer, 1979. Shot dead on orders of Museveni, seen as a threat to Museveni’s ambitions. Museveni came to the home of George and Joyce Kihuguru at Makerere University a few minutes after Ruhinda’s shooting there, pretending to be a concerned mourner. Ruhinda had gone to the Kihuguru’s home to eat millet.
32. Boniface Kaija Katuramu, Kampala quantity surveyor, 1979. Shot dead at his Malcolm X Avenue home in Kampala as part of Museveni’s reign of terror to create image of unstable Uganda after Amin.
33. James Matovu, cousin of Kabaka Ronald Mwenda Mutebi of Buganda , 1979. Shot dead at his home in Kampala . The Buganda prince was one of several prominent Ugandans murdered on orders of Defence Minister Yoweri Museveni to create an atmosphere of lawlessness in Uganda and show that President Godfrey Binaisa had failed to govern Uganda .
34. Bob Naenda Odong, news reader, Uganda Television, 1980. Shot dead on orders of Museveni as part of efforts to create image of chaos in Kampala .
35. Edidian Luttamaguzi, peasant leader in Semuto, 1981. NRA legend has it that Luttamaguzi was hiding Museveni in his house and government troops came to surround the place and kill Museveni. Museveni hid up in a tree and as the UNLA troops killed Luttamaguzi, Museveni perched in the tree watched helplessly. That was on June 9, 1981 and that is why the NRM marks that day as Hero’s Day because Luttamaguzi saved Museveni’s life by refusing to tell the UNLA where Museveni was. It is the NRA which killed Luttamaguzi in order to stiffen the harted for Obote among the Luwero peasants. Museveni created this story of his narrow escape as one of the NRA legends. That day in 1981, Museveni was not in Uganda but in Nairobi signing a merger agreement between his Popular Resistance Army and Yusufu Lule’s Uganda Freedom Fighters.
36. Ahmed Seguya, first commander of the NRA, 1981. Poisoned on orders of Museveni.
37. Beatrice Kemigisha, Makerere University lecturer and NRM supporter, 1981. NRM officials used to visit Kemigisha at her flat at the university. Museveni passed on information to the UNLA that she was an NRA supporter and she was arrested. NRA men in the UNLA army raped and tortured her to death as part of Museveni’s plan to have Obote’s image tarnished.
38. Lt. Col. William Ndahendekire, army officer, 1982. Killed on orders of Museveni after Ndahendekire refused to join Museveni’s NRA war.
39. Lt. Mule Muwanga, original NRA officer, 1982. Murdered during guerrilla war. Reasons unknown.
40. George Bamuturaki, UPC Member of Parliament, 1983. Shot dead at Kisimenti in Kampala because during 1980 election campaigns Bamuturaki had argued that Museveni, a Rwandese, should not be president of Uganda .
41. Gideon Akankwasa, lawyer with Hunter & Grieg law firm, 1983. Shot dead outside the gate of his home on Kyadondo Road in Nakasero, Kampala, to blame it on Chief of Staff David Oyite Ojok and tarnish Obote’s image. After the 1980 election, one of Akankwasa’s partners in Hunter & Grieg, Jonathan Kateera, handled Museveni’s petition.
42. Lt. Sam Magara, second commander of the NRA, 1983. Betrayed to the UNLA by Museveni in order to eliminate threat in the bush. One of the people captured during the siege on Katenta Apuuli’s house said Magara was sent to Kampala by Museveni and only Museveni could have known where Magara was staying while in Kampala .
43. Thompson Sabiti, civil servant and son of late Anglican Archbishop Eric Sabiiti, 1983. Clubbed to death near the Lake Victoria Hotel and the Ministry of Planning in Entebbe by Museveni’s NRA men and Museveni blamed his death on the bodyguards of the vice president Paulo Muwanga. Museveni wanted the Protestant Bahima community to turn in large numbers from Obote and become more loyal to the NRA. Sabiti was a good target.
44. Prof. Yusufu Kironde Lule, former head of state and chairman of National Resistance Movement, 1985. Murdered by slow-acting poison in London because of his popularity and threat to Museveni’s ambitions.
45. Enock Kabundu, Entebbe civil servant and Museveni supporter, 1985. Kabundu was one of Museveni’s staunchest supporters and Museveni used this against him. During the time of the Nairobi peace talks in December 1985, Museveni ordered two sisters working as prostitutes and informers for the NRA, Margaret and Anne Katanywa, to help get rid of Kabundu. Margaret and Anne Katanywa convinced a UNLA officer they were dating, Lt. Col. Obonyo that Kabundu was an NRA rebel. Obonyo had Kabundu taken to the Lutembe beach off the Kampala-Entebbe road where he was killed, his buttocks cut off in order to show that the Tito Okello regime was not sincere about peace talks through this action of murdering a Museveni supporter. Two years before this, Museveni had used the same tactic in killing a prominent Muhima in Entebbe , Thompson Sabiti.
46. Lt. Sam Katabarwa, NRA commander, 1986. Sent to mediate peace with UPC government, was arrested, but was alive after Museveni took power in 1986 and killed on orders of Museveni. He was a popular officer seen as a threat to Museveni’s power.
47. Capt. Robert Kagata Namiti, UNLA army officer, 1986. Murdered by a slow-acting poison injection by the NRA medical services on Museveni’s orders because he knew details of who killed Sam Katabarwa.
48. Capt. Abbey Kalega Sserwada, former Uganda Freedom Movement commandeer, 1986. He was arrested and detained at Lubiri barracks, tortured, his ears were cut off and he was killed by senior NRA officers with Museveni’s approval.
49. Francis Gureme, NRA officer, son of retired civil servant and writer F.D.R. Gureme, 1986. Killed in northern Uganda allegedly by rebels during a mission. Real reason was a set up, on orders of Museveni, after Gureme began asking too many questions about NRA atrocities in the north.
50. Major Peter Musana, former head of School of Logistics and Engineering, Jinja, 1987. Reasons unclear. He was killed by a slow-acting poison a few months after being released from prison. He might have know Capt. Namiti and how he died.
51. Andrew Lutakome Kayiira, cabinet minister and former leader of the Uganda Freedom Movement, 1987. Shot dead in Konge, Makindye, Kampala by a hit squad comprising Major Paul Kagame, James Kazini, Lt. Col. Kasirye Gwanga, Lt. Col. Moses Nyanzi (a.k.a “Drago”) and ESO assassin Humphrey Babukika. In the 1980s bush wars, Kayiira’s UFM was always the better equipped force than Museveni’s NRA and Museveni felt Kayiira was his main rival for power. The Scotland Yard report on Kayira’s death is reported to have mentioned Major Paul Kagame or Brig. Jim Muhwezi as the architect of the assassination.
52. Lance Sera Muwanga, housed Museveni’s family in exile in Sweden and human rights activist, 1988. Killed by slow-acting poison for his vocal views on Museveni’s atrocities in northern Uganda and his elimination of his political. Muwanga and the BBC correspondent Henry Gombya in a joint 1986 work wrote that the “Black Bombers” hit squad of the NRA led by Patrick Lumumba, Paul Kagame, Matayo Kyaligonza, Pecos Kutesa, Hannington Mugabi, Jero Bwende, and others were the ones carrying out the massacres of civilians in the Luwero Triangle in order to blame them on the Obote regime.
53. Robert Ekinu, deputy secretary of the Treasury, 1988. He was shot on orders of Museveni on a peace mission with other Teso ministers like Stanislus Okurut, the killing blamed on the Teso rebels, so as to paint the Teso rebels in a bad light and justify Museveni’s aggressive military offensive there. Museveni pretended to be hurt by Ekinu’s death by giving Ekinu’s widow a job in Bank of Uganda and giving the bereaved family the government house they occupied in Entebbe .
54. Henry Mugisa, DP stalwart, member of National Resistance Council and Managing Director of Consolidated Properties, the government parastatal, 1989. Shot dead at his Kololo, Kampala home on orders of Museveni because he knew about Museveni’s hand in stealing government companies under the guise of privatisation. Museveni gave away his guilt by having Mugisa’s body flown to hi burial in Bunyoro and a high powered government delegation attending the funeral.
55. Major General Fred Rwigyema, first commander of Rwandan Patriotic Army and former minister of state for defence, 1990. Shot by Major Peter Baingana and Major Chris Bunyenyezi on orders of Museveni. Rwigyema had been telling his wife Jeanette that his life was in danger in Uganda , that’s why he decided to defect to Rwanda before Museveni could assassinate him.
56. Major Peter Baingana, Rwandan Patriotic Army commander, 1990. Shot dead at a farm inside Uganda by Major General Salim Saleh on orders of Museveni, to cover up Museveni’s assassination of Fred Rwigyema.
57. Major Chris Bunyenyezi, Rwandan Patriotic Army commander, 1990. Shot dead at a farm inside Uganda by Major General Salim Saleh on orders of Museveni, to cover up Museveni’s assassination of Fred Rwigyema.
58. Chris Mboijana, General Manager of Uganda Airlines, 1990. Poisoned in London after Museveni stole money intended by management to buy four new Airbus planes for Uganda Airlines. Museveni knew that the trail of the theft would lead to him and he had to get rid of Mboijana who was once one of his staunchest supporters.
59. Emmanuel Cardinal Nsubuga, Catholic Church’s influential leader in Uganda , 1991. Murdered by contagious radioactive poison put under his plate on orders of Museveni, because of his growing criticism of Museveni’s murder of high-profile Ugandans and because he knew of Museveni’s atrocities against Ugandans in Luwero.
60. Lt. Col. Julius Aine, NRA army officer, 1991. Murdered in fake car accident. Aine and Jack Muchunguzi were some of the NRA officers Museveni charged with killing Ahmed Seguya and this killing of Aine could have been to prevent him from spilling the secret.
61. Paulo Muwanga, former vice president and chairman of the Military Commission, 1991. Injected with slow-acting poison in Luzira prison because he knew details of Museveni’s orchestrated genocide in Luwero Triangle.
62. John Begumisa, Commercial manager of Uganda Airlines, 1992. Shit dead at his home in Entebbe , after Museveni stole the money intended to buy four new Airbus planes for Uganda Airlines. NRA killers dressed up as doctors were brought to Grade A Hospital in Entebbe to make sure the wounded Begumisa did not survive the gunshot wounds.
63. Edward Mugalu, Kampala businessman and Democratic Party supporter, 1992. Shot dead near Lugogo, Kampala , on orders of Museveni, as part of his plan to eliminate DP figures close to Andrew Kayiira. Mugalu was also a strong Buganda monarchist and influential businessman.
64. Prof. Dan Mudoola, Makerere University lecturer and vice chairman of the Constitutional Review Commission., 1993. He was killed in a grenade attack in Wandegeya in order to frustrate the progress of the constitution-making process.
65. Dr Francis Kidubuka, Makerere University lecturer, 1993. Killed by grenade while having a drink outside the Paris Hotel in Wandegeya with Mudoola.
66. Amon Bazira, former UPC deputy minister, 1993. Bazira was shot dead in Nakuru , Kenya by ESO assassin Humphrey Babukika, in a plot hatched by Museveni.
67. President Melchior Ndadaye, head of state of Burundi , 1993. Assassins of Ndadaye were given shelter in Uganda and after mission was accomplished, were housed at state expense in the Kampala Sheraton Hotel.
68. President Juvenal Habyarimana, head of state of Rwanda , 1994. Killed in missile attack on his plane, ordered by Museveni. Habyarimana had approached ISO director general Brig. Jim Muhwezi with money and surface-to-air missiles to shoot down Museveni’s plane. Museveni gave Muhwezi the money and decided to hit Habyarimana with his won medicine. The assassins were trained near Lake Nabugabo in Masaka and the missiles were driven into Rwanda by RFA officer James Kabareebe.
69. President Cyprien Ntaryamira, head of state of Burundi , 1994. Killed in Habyarimana’s plane.
70. Benjamin Matogo, Uganda ’s High Commissioner to Tanzania , 1994. Matogo had gained sensitive information that Museveni masterminded the genocide against the Tutsi of Rwanda even before Habyarimana was assassinated. Ugandan intelligence intercepted his communication in which they knew he knew of Museveni’s role in both the assassination of Habyarimana and Ntarymira and the Ugandan death squads Museveni got to dress up as Hutu extremists that would kill Tutsis at random as he had done in Luwero Triangle. Matogo was killed using a slow-acting poison.
71. Hussein Musa Njuki, journalist and editor of Assalaam and former editor of Shariat newsletters, 1995. Killed by agents of Military Intelligence using a poison that induces sudden heart attacks and he was taken to a Kampala police station to die. Njuki had become a strong critic of Museveni and his regime. Museveni used Njuki and Ahmed Seguya as FRONASA men to distribute disinformation in Uganda in the Amin era.
72. Lt. Col. Ladislaw Serwanga Lwanga, former NRA chief political commissar, 1996. Killed by slow-acting poison although he was also HIV-positive, because he was seen as a threat poised by vocal Baganda officers.
73. Lt. Michael Shalita, Intelligence officer with the Internal Security Organisation, 1997. Shot in Kamwokya on orders of Museveni. Shalita was investigating cases of massive corruption involving top government parastatals like the Uganda Revenue Authority and the Uganda Posts & Telecommunications Corporation in which the Museveni family had an interest.
74. Brig. Fred Kamwesiga, 1997? Invited to State House dinner with Museveni and contagious poison put in his plate, for opposing parliamentary candidature of Augustine Ruzindana and calling Ruzindana a Rwandese unfit to run for MP in Uganda .
75. Lt. Col. Reuben Ikondere, UPDF officer, 1998. Murdered in eastern Congo on orders of Museveni for questioning why the First Family was plundering the wealth of Congo yet they claimed to be there to secure Uganda ’s borders. His murder was covered up as a stabbing by the Mai Mai warriors.
76. Dr. Akiiki Mujaju, a lecturer in Political Science at Makerere University and dean of the Social Sciences faculty, 1998?. Mujaju was murdered in a faked car accident along the Kampala-Fort Portal road because he had got sensitive information on the NRM government’s record and was about to publish it.
77. Joanne Cotton, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999. The murders were planned personally by Museveni in order to scare the West and justify Uganda ’s invasion of Congo on the excuse of pursuing the ADF rebels and Rwandan Interahamwe who were accused of committing the crime. At a press conference in Kampala after the killings, Museveni pretended to be very hurt by the tourists’ deaths and took charge of the hunt for the killers.
78. Steve Roberts, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
79. Mark Lindgren, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
80. Martin Friend, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
81. Gary Tappenden, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
82. Rob Haubner, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
83. Susan Miller, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
84. Lt. Col. Jet Mwebaze, UPDF officer, 1999. Shot in the forehead in Congo on orders of Salim Saleh with Museveni’s approval, for questioning why Saleh and Museveni’s son Muhoozi Kainerugaba were exporting beef to Congo and looting minerals, instead of looking out for Uganda ’s security interests. The government claimed it was an accident but there was an unexplained gunshot wound on his forehead. His body was returned in a sealed coffin and his family was not allowed to view his body. His brother, General James Kazini, is still convinced that there was foul play in Mwebaze’s death.
85. Anthony Ssekweyama, DP stalwart and human rights activist, 1999. Murdered and a fake car accident staged to cover up, on orders of Museveni after he catalogued Museveni’s murder of high profile Ugandans and the NRA’s atrocities in northern Uganda. Fortunately, forensic evidence of Ssekweyama’s murder was smuggled out of Uganda and to the United States .
86. Charles Owor, national electoral commissioner, 2000. He was shot dead in Kenya by ESO agents and an accident faked after he protested vigorously at the massive rigging that robbed DP presidential candidate the 1996 election. Owor had sensitive and damning evidence of how Museveni rigged the 1996 election.
87. Henry Kayondo, lawyer and DP direhard, 2000. He was poisoned by the same East Bloc KGB poison used to kill Brig. Kamwesiga, which induces sudden heart failure and makes people believe it was a genuine heart attack. Kayondo was a consistent critic of the NRM’s anti-democratic tendencies and Museveni ordered him silenced.
88. Mukono, Uganda Posts & Telecommunications employee, 2000. Mr. Mukono was gunned down at his home in Namungoona the day before he was supposed to testify at a commission probe into shady activities in the company. The killers, sent by Museveni, left with Mukono’s briefcase where he had put files and official documents of evidence.
89. President Laurent Desire Kabila, head of state of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2001. Shot dead by bodyguard of Col. Kahinda Otafiire. An ESO intelligence officer confirmed to Reuters agency that Kabila was dead when the rest of the world was still guessing.
90. Spencer Turomwe, opposition mobiliser and husband to Betty Olive Kamya, 2001. Although he was HIV-positive and was killed by Military Intelligence agents dressed up as doctors using a slow-acting poison injection because of his influence as a mobiliser and vocal NRM government critic. The government said they hoped his widow Betty Kamya would be intimidated by their murder of Turomwe but instead she became bolder as an FDC envoy.
91. Agnes Katama, managing director of SWIPCO procurement company, 2002. She was murdered and her death was blamed on a staged car accident on the Kampala-Fort Portal road because she was beginning to question too much the huge corrupt deals involving the First Family in government procurements.
92. Brig. Gad Wilson Toko, former minister of defence, 2002 Murdered in fake accident. Toko during a session of the peace talks in Nairobi had walked across the table and slapped Museveni, shouting angrily why Museveni a Rwandese was determined to fight “your wars in our country.” Museveni never forgave him for that public slap.
93. Christine Kania, a member of the Constitutional Review Commission, 2002. She was killed on the same day as Brig. Toko
94. Deus Mugizi, former Uganda Airlines manager, 2002. Gunmen came to his home in Bunga outside Kampala and as his mother pleaded for her son’s life, they said they had not come for property but for his life. Mugizi had protested many times at the sale of Uganda Airlines’ routes to the new East African Airlines which is owned in part by the Museveni family. He also knew about the four Airbus planes that Uganda Airlines was supposed to have bought and Museveni siphoned off the money.
95. Jonah Mulindwa, camera man with Presidential Press Unit, 2003. He was an eye witness to some dirty dealings that Museveni was conducting in State House. Museveni has a secret room in State House which only he opens, where he keeps a statue of himself surrounded by bones, skulls, and witchcraft items. One day Mrs. Janet Museveni opened the room, saw the skulls and bones and almost fainted.
96. Francis Ayume, Solicitor General and attorney General, 2004. Shot dead by Anthony Butele and them accident faked. Family was discouraged from viewing Ayume’s body. Ayume had been a strong critic of the Third Term project and was viewed as presidential material.
97. Robinah Kiyingi, Kampala lawyer and country director of Transparency International, 2005. Shot dead outside her home just outside Kampala . She had gathered damning data on her laptop computer on the massive corruption personally sanctioned by Museveni for his family. Transparency International had estimated Museveni’s worth was at $4billion. Museveni gave away his hand in Kiyingi’s murder by saying he had a great interest in following how the case and trial were going.
98. John Garang Demabior, First Vice President of Sudan and chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, 2005. Killed aboard Museveni’s helicopter. Garang had come to Uganda to demand back a huge cache of arms belonging to the SPLA which Museveni had stolen and could not account for. The altimeter on the helicopter was tampered with in order to endanger the craft and the SPLA using global positioning systems established that the helicopter came down inside Uganda and not Sudan as Kampala claimed.
99. Sgt. John Atwine, alleged killer of Robinah Kiyingi, 2005. Poisoned in Luzira prison to cover up evidence of his framing and Museveni’s role in murder of Robinah Kiyingi.
100. Kevin Aliro, Managing Editor, Weekly Observer, 2005. One of Museveni’s main methods of dealing with his opponents since the 1990s has been to hit them when they are HIV-positive and in that way few people see the cause of death as foul play. He did this with Spencer Turomwe and Kevin Aliro, one of the courageous critics of the government. Patriotic sources in intelligence who are disgusted with Museveni’s handling of the country passed this information on to the Opposition that Aliro was actually killed using the poison spray that Winnie Byanyima had feared the government would use on Colonel Besigye while in Luzira.
The Mulindwas Communication Group "With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy" , Groupe de communication Mulindwas "avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie"
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Human Rights Watch-New York, USA, Jan 20: In its 2006 annual report, the NewYork based Human Rights Watch body says Uganda failed to make progress on human rights and its international reputation suffered in 2005. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/uganda12284_txt.htm HRW also says, Uganda’s military courts must respect the jurisdiction of the nation’s superior civilian courts, Human Rights Watch said today. January 19, 2006 Press Release Uganda: Military Must Bow to Civilian Courts
Human Rights Watch-New York, USA Nov 24: The New York based Human Rights Watch has called on the U.S Bush Administration to halt the accelerating political repression in Uganda. In a statement released on Wednesday, Human Rights Watch says the U.S Should Cut Relations With Uganda government forces who stormed Courthouse last week in Uganda’s capital Kampala. Human Rights Watch also says, the Ugandan government should reverse its ban on speech and demonstrations linked to the trial of the main opposition candidate for president, Dr. Kizza Besigye, and end its intimidation of the courts. Human Rights Watch Country Researcher for Uganda, Rone said, “Opposition supporters in Uganda have a right to peacefully protest any aspect of the judicial proceedings. They also have the right to demonstrate in support of their presidential candidate’s freedom.” http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/11/24/uganda12089.htm
New York, USA Dec13: Uganda’s Electoral Commission Must Uphold Presumption of Innocence
Essential Background: Overview of human rights issues in Uganda (Human Rights Watch, December 31, 2
www.hrw.org
Uganda failed to make progress on human rights and its international reputation suffered in 2005. The conflict in northern Uganda claimed victims daily and more than 1.5 million people continued to languish in displaced persons camps, vulnerable to abuses by the brutal Lord?s Resistance Army (LRA) a
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE
•Olara on Genocide in N. Uganda Author Olara Otunnu
•NOTES ON CONCEALMENT OF GENOCIDE IN UGANDA Author late Dr. A.M Obote (RIP )
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Uganda, Jan 5: Victims of Yoweri Museveni’s reign of terror - (May they RIP)
•1. Brig. Perino Okoya, commander of Second Infantry Brigade, 1970. Personally shot dead by GSU intelligence officer Yoweri Museveni.
2. Nicholas Stroh, American journalist, 1971. Murdered by Lt. Silver Tibahika on orders of Museveni, for investigating FRONASA’s murder of Acholi and Langi army officers.
3. Robert Siedle, Makerere University lecturer, 1971. Murdered by Lt. Silver Tibahika on orders of Museveni, for investigating FRONASA’s murder of Acholi and Langi army officers.
4. James Bwogi, director of Uganda Television, 1971. Murdered by FRONASA agents to tarnish image of President Idi Amin.
5. Michael Kabali Kaggwa, president of Uganda Industrial Court , 1971. Murdered by FRONASA agents and burnt in his car, to turn Baganda against Amin.
6. Father Clement Kiggundu, Roman Catholic priest and former editor of Muuno newspaper, 1971. Dragged from altar during Mass to turn Baganda and Catholics against Amin.
7. Raiti Omongin, first leader of FRONASA, 1972. Personally shot in the mouth by Museveni during a morning parade in Tabora, after Museveni’s claim to FRONASA leadership was challenged.
8. Ali Picho Owiny, former GSU intelligence officer and colleague of Museveni, 1972. Murdered during the attack on Mbarara by Museveni because of his habit of humiliating Museveni in the office. The murder was blamed on Amin’s soldiers.
9. Valerino Rwaheru, comrade in arms of Museveni, 1972. Killed by Museveni to eliminate challenge to his leadership of FRONASA.
10. William a.k.a “Black” Mwesigwa, comrade in arms of Museveni, 1972. Murdered during invastion of Mbarara, to be blamed on Amin’s troops.
11. Basil Kiiza Bataringaya, former minister of Internal Affairs, 1972. Murdered by FRONASA agents and thrown into Rwizi river in Mbarara.
12. Erifazi Laki, county chief of Rwampara, 1972. Killed by FRONASA agents on orders of Museveni, because as a former GSU intelligence officer Laki possibly knew of Museveni’s hand in murdering Brig. Okoya or was a threat to Museveni’s ambitions. The private detective who in 2001 undertook to investigate Laki’s murder was poisoned on orders of Museveni.
13. Patrick Ruhinda, lawyer, 1972. Murdered by FRONASA to turn Ankole against Amin.
14. Benedicto Kiwanuka, president general of DP and Chief Justice, 1972. Abducted from the High Court buildings and shot dead by FRONASA agents near Bombo Road , Wandegeya, to tarnish Amin’s image. The abduction car was driven by a Musoga FRONASA man, Capt. Kaganda.
15. Frank Kalimuzo, vice chancellor of Makerere University , 1972. Murdered by FRONASA agents, to cause fear in Uganda ’s civil service and academic circles. The story of Kalimuzo’s death given by Kintu Musoke had many inconsistencies.
16. John Kakonge, secretary general of Uganda People’s Congress, 1972. Murdered to tarnish Amin’s image.
17. James Karuhanga, comrade in arms of Museveni, 1973. Shot dead by Museveni and blamed on Amin’s troops.
18. Hope Rwaheru, wife of Museveni and sister of Valeriano Rwaheru, 1973. Mother of Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, reportedly strangled by Museveni in Dar es Salaam .
19. Lt. Col. Michael Ondoga, minister of Foreign Affairs, 1974. Kidnapped and murdered by FRONASA agents led by Kahinda Otafiire and body thrown into River Nile.
20. Martin Mwesiga, comrade in arms of Museveni, 1974. Shot dead by Museveni after he witnessed shooting of Omongin.
21. Edith Bataringaya, wife of Basil Bataringaya, 1975. Burnt alive by FRONASA agents in order to discredit Amin.
22. Theresa Nanziri Bukenya, warden of Africa girls’ Hall at Makerere University , 1976. Killed personally by Museveni, by slitting open her stomach when she was eight months pregnant, in order to create more hatred for Amin among Ugandans.
23. Jimmy Parma, photographer, Voice of Uganda, 1976. Murdered by FRONASA for taking photographs of body of Israeli hostage Dora Bloch after Entebbe raid.
24. Esther Chesire, Kenyan student at Makerere University , 1976. Kidnapped by State Research agents working for Museveni’s FRONASA at Entebbe International Airport , in order to stir up hostility between Uganda and Kenya following Israeli attack on Entebbe .
25. Sally Githere, Kenyan student at Makerere University , 1976. Kidnapped by State Research agents working for Museveni’s FRONASA at Entebbe International Airport , in order to stir up hostility between Uganda and Kenya following Israeli attack on Entebbe .
26. Lt. Col. Sarapio Kakuhikire, army officer, 1977. Abducted and killed by FRONASA agents outside main Kampala Post Office in order to discredit Amin.
27. Dr. Jack Barlow, dentist opponents at Mulago Hospital , 1979. Shot dead in Kampala . Barlow was one of several doctors and senior civil servants murdered on orders of Defence Minister Yoweri Museveni to create an atmosphere of lawlessness in Uganda and show that President Godfrey Binaisa had failed to govern Uganda . Killers said they had been sent for his life, not his money or property.
28. Dr. Stephen Obache, doctor at Mulago hospital, 1979. Shot dead in Kampala . He was one of several doctors and senior civil servants murdered on orders of Defence Minister Yoweri Museveni to create an atmosphere of lawlessness in Uganda and show that President Godfrey Binaisa had failed to govern Uganda .
29. Dr. Joseph Kamulegeya, doctor for Kampala City Council, 1979. Shot dead in Kampala . He was one of several doctors and senior civil servants murdered on orders of Defence Minister Yoweri Museveni to create an atmosphere of lawlessness in Uganda and show that President Godfrey Binaisa had failed to govern Uganda .
30. Dr. Mitchell Bagenda, doctor at Mulago Hospital , 1979. Shot dead in his home at his home in Kampala . He was one of several doctors and senior civil servants murdered on orders of Defence Minister Yoweri Museveni to create an atmosphere of lawlessness in Uganda and show that President Godfrey Binaisa had failed to govern Uganda .
31. Lt. Colonel John Ruhinda, UNLA officer, 1979. Shot dead on orders of Museveni, seen as a threat to Museveni’s ambitions. Museveni came to the home of George and Joyce Kihuguru at Makerere University a few minutes after Ruhinda’s shooting there, pretending to be a concerned mourner. Ruhinda had gone to the Kihuguru’s home to eat millet.
32. Boniface Kaija Katuramu, Kampala quantity surveyor, 1979. Shot dead at his Malcolm X Avenue home in Kampala as part of Museveni’s reign of terror to create image of unstable Uganda after Amin.
33. James Matovu, cousin of Kabaka Ronald Mwenda Mutebi of Buganda , 1979. Shot dead at his home in Kampala . The Buganda prince was one of several prominent Ugandans murdered on orders of Defence Minister Yoweri Museveni to create an atmosphere of lawlessness in Uganda and show that President Godfrey Binaisa had failed to govern Uganda .
34. Bob Naenda Odong, news reader, Uganda Television, 1980. Shot dead on orders of Museveni as part of efforts to create image of chaos in Kampala .
35. Edidian Luttamaguzi, peasant leader in Semuto, 1981. NRA legend has it that Luttamaguzi was hiding Museveni in his house and government troops came to surround the place and kill Museveni. Museveni hid up in a tree and as the UNLA troops killed Luttamaguzi, Museveni perched in the tree watched helplessly. That was on June 9, 1981 and that is why the NRM marks that day as Hero’s Day because Luttamaguzi saved Museveni’s life by refusing to tell the UNLA where Museveni was. It is the NRA which killed Luttamaguzi in order to stiffen the harted for Obote among the Luwero peasants. Museveni created this story of his narrow escape as one of the NRA legends. That day in 1981, Museveni was not in Uganda but in Nairobi signing a merger agreement between his Popular Resistance Army and Yusufu Lule’s Uganda Freedom Fighters.
36. Ahmed Seguya, first commander of the NRA, 1981. Poisoned on orders of Museveni.
37. Beatrice Kemigisha, Makerere University lecturer and NRM supporter, 1981. NRM officials used to visit Kemigisha at her flat at the university. Museveni passed on information to the UNLA that she was an NRA supporter and she was arrested. NRA men in the UNLA army raped and tortured her to death as part of Museveni’s plan to have Obote’s image tarnished.
38. Lt. Col. William Ndahendekire, army officer, 1982. Killed on orders of Museveni after Ndahendekire refused to join Museveni’s NRA war.
39. Lt. Mule Muwanga, original NRA officer, 1982. Murdered during guerrilla war. Reasons unknown.
40. George Bamuturaki, UPC Member of Parliament, 1983. Shot dead at Kisimenti in Kampala because during 1980 election campaigns Bamuturaki had argued that Museveni, a Rwandese, should not be president of Uganda .
41. Gideon Akankwasa, lawyer with Hunter & Grieg law firm, 1983. Shot dead outside the gate of his home on Kyadondo Road in Nakasero, Kampala, to blame it on Chief of Staff David Oyite Ojok and tarnish Obote’s image. After the 1980 election, one of Akankwasa’s partners in Hunter & Grieg, Jonathan Kateera, handled Museveni’s petition.
42. Lt. Sam Magara, second commander of the NRA, 1983. Betrayed to the UNLA by Museveni in order to eliminate threat in the bush. One of the people captured during the siege on Katenta Apuuli’s house said Magara was sent to Kampala by Museveni and only Museveni could have known where Magara was staying while in Kampala .
43. Thompson Sabiti, civil servant and son of late Anglican Archbishop Eric Sabiiti, 1983. Clubbed to death near the Lake Victoria Hotel and the Ministry of Planning in Entebbe by Museveni’s NRA men and Museveni blamed his death on the bodyguards of the vice president Paulo Muwanga. Museveni wanted the Protestant Bahima community to turn in large numbers from Obote and become more loyal to the NRA. Sabiti was a good target.
44. Prof. Yusufu Kironde Lule, former head of state and chairman of National Resistance Movement, 1985. Murdered by slow-acting poison in London because of his popularity and threat to Museveni’s ambitions.
45. Enock Kabundu, Entebbe civil servant and Museveni supporter, 1985. Kabundu was one of Museveni’s staunchest supporters and Museveni used this against him. During the time of the Nairobi peace talks in December 1985, Museveni ordered two sisters working as prostitutes and informers for the NRA, Margaret and Anne Katanywa, to help get rid of Kabundu. Margaret and Anne Katanywa convinced a UNLA officer they were dating, Lt. Col. Obonyo that Kabundu was an NRA rebel. Obonyo had Kabundu taken to the Lutembe beach off the Kampala-Entebbe road where he was killed, his buttocks cut off in order to show that the Tito Okello regime was not sincere about peace talks through this action of murdering a Museveni supporter. Two years before this, Museveni had used the same tactic in killing a prominent Muhima in Entebbe , Thompson Sabiti.
46. Lt. Sam Katabarwa, NRA commander, 1986. Sent to mediate peace with UPC government, was arrested, but was alive after Museveni took power in 1986 and killed on orders of Museveni. He was a popular officer seen as a threat to Museveni’s power.
47. Capt. Robert Kagata Namiti, UNLA army officer, 1986. Murdered by a slow-acting poison injection by the NRA medical services on Museveni’s orders because he knew details of who killed Sam Katabarwa.
48. Capt. Abbey Kalega Sserwada, former Uganda Freedom Movement commandeer, 1986. He was arrested and detained at Lubiri barracks, tortured, his ears were cut off and he was killed by senior NRA officers with Museveni’s approval.
49. Francis Gureme, NRA officer, son of retired civil servant and writer F.D.R. Gureme, 1986. Killed in northern Uganda allegedly by rebels during a mission. Real reason was a set up, on orders of Museveni, after Gureme began asking too many questions about NRA atrocities in the north.
50. Major Peter Musana, former head of School of Logistics and Engineering, Jinja, 1987. Reasons unclear. He was killed by a slow-acting poison a few months after being released from prison. He might have know Capt. Namiti and how he died.
51. Andrew Lutakome Kayiira, cabinet minister and former leader of the Uganda Freedom Movement, 1987. Shot dead in Konge, Makindye, Kampala by a hit squad comprising Major Paul Kagame, James Kazini, Lt. Col. Kasirye Gwanga, Lt. Col. Moses Nyanzi (a.k.a “Drago”) and ESO assassin Humphrey Babukika. In the 1980s bush wars, Kayiira’s UFM was always the better equipped force than Museveni’s NRA and Museveni felt Kayiira was his main rival for power. The Scotland Yard report on Kayira’s death is reported to have mentioned Major Paul Kagame or Brig. Jim Muhwezi as the architect of the assassination.
52. Lance Sera Muwanga, housed Museveni’s family in exile in Sweden and human rights activist, 1988. Killed by slow-acting poison for his vocal views on Museveni’s atrocities in northern Uganda and his elimination of his political. Muwanga and the BBC correspondent Henry Gombya in a joint 1986 work wrote that the “Black Bombers” hit squad of the NRA led by Patrick Lumumba, Paul Kagame, Matayo Kyaligonza, Pecos Kutesa, Hannington Mugabi, Jero Bwende, and others were the ones carrying out the massacres of civilians in the Luwero Triangle in order to blame them on the Obote regime.
53. Robert Ekinu, deputy secretary of the Treasury, 1988. He was shot on orders of Museveni on a peace mission with other Teso ministers like Stanislus Okurut, the killing blamed on the Teso rebels, so as to paint the Teso rebels in a bad light and justify Museveni’s aggressive military offensive there. Museveni pretended to be hurt by Ekinu’s death by giving Ekinu’s widow a job in Bank of Uganda and giving the bereaved family the government house they occupied in Entebbe .
54. Henry Mugisa, DP stalwart, member of National Resistance Council and Managing Director of Consolidated Properties, the government parastatal, 1989. Shot dead at his Kololo, Kampala home on orders of Museveni because he knew about Museveni’s hand in stealing government companies under the guise of privatisation. Museveni gave away his guilt by having Mugisa’s body flown to hi burial in Bunyoro and a high powered government delegation attending the funeral.
55. Major General Fred Rwigyema, first commander of Rwandan Patriotic Army and former minister of state for defence, 1990. Shot by Major Peter Baingana and Major Chris Bunyenyezi on orders of Museveni. Rwigyema had been telling his wife Jeanette that his life was in danger in Uganda , that’s why he decided to defect to Rwanda before Museveni could assassinate him.
56. Major Peter Baingana, Rwandan Patriotic Army commander, 1990. Shot dead at a farm inside Uganda by Major General Salim Saleh on orders of Museveni, to cover up Museveni’s assassination of Fred Rwigyema.
57. Major Chris Bunyenyezi, Rwandan Patriotic Army commander, 1990. Shot dead at a farm inside Uganda by Major General Salim Saleh on orders of Museveni, to cover up Museveni’s assassination of Fred Rwigyema.
58. Chris Mboijana, General Manager of Uganda Airlines, 1990. Poisoned in London after Museveni stole money intended by management to buy four new Airbus planes for Uganda Airlines. Museveni knew that the trail of the theft would lead to him and he had to get rid of Mboijana who was once one of his staunchest supporters.
59. Emmanuel Cardinal Nsubuga, Catholic Church’s influential leader in Uganda , 1991. Murdered by contagious radioactive poison put under his plate on orders of Museveni, because of his growing criticism of Museveni’s murder of high-profile Ugandans and because he knew of Museveni’s atrocities against Ugandans in Luwero.
60. Lt. Col. Julius Aine, NRA army officer, 1991. Murdered in fake car accident. Aine and Jack Muchunguzi were some of the NRA officers Museveni charged with killing Ahmed Seguya and this killing of Aine could have been to prevent him from spilling the secret.
61. Paulo Muwanga, former vice president and chairman of the Military Commission, 1991. Injected with slow-acting poison in Luzira prison because he knew details of Museveni’s orchestrated genocide in Luwero Triangle.
62. John Begumisa, Commercial manager of Uganda Airlines, 1992. Shit dead at his home in Entebbe , after Museveni stole the money intended to buy four new Airbus planes for Uganda Airlines. NRA killers dressed up as doctors were brought to Grade A Hospital in Entebbe to make sure the wounded Begumisa did not survive the gunshot wounds.
63. Edward Mugalu, Kampala businessman and Democratic Party supporter, 1992. Shot dead near Lugogo, Kampala , on orders of Museveni, as part of his plan to eliminate DP figures close to Andrew Kayiira. Mugalu was also a strong Buganda monarchist and influential businessman.
64. Prof. Dan Mudoola, Makerere University lecturer and vice chairman of the Constitutional Review Commission., 1993. He was killed in a grenade attack in Wandegeya in order to frustrate the progress of the constitution-making process.
65. Dr Francis Kidubuka, Makerere University lecturer, 1993. Killed by grenade while having a drink outside the Paris Hotel in Wandegeya with Mudoola.
66. Amon Bazira, former UPC deputy minister, 1993. Bazira was shot dead in Nakuru , Kenya by ESO assassin Humphrey Babukika, in a plot hatched by Museveni.
67. President Melchior Ndadaye, head of state of Burundi , 1993. Assassins of Ndadaye were given shelter in Uganda and after mission was accomplished, were housed at state expense in the Kampala Sheraton Hotel.
68. President Juvenal Habyarimana, head of state of Rwanda , 1994. Killed in missile attack on his plane, ordered by Museveni. Habyarimana had approached ISO director general Brig. Jim Muhwezi with money and surface-to-air missiles to shoot down Museveni’s plane. Museveni gave Muhwezi the money and decided to hit Habyarimana with his won medicine. The assassins were trained near Lake Nabugabo in Masaka and the missiles were driven into Rwanda by RFA officer James Kabareebe.
69. President Cyprien Ntaryamira, head of state of Burundi , 1994. Killed in Habyarimana’s plane.
70. Benjamin Matogo, Uganda ’s High Commissioner to Tanzania , 1994. Matogo had gained sensitive information that Museveni masterminded the genocide against the Tutsi of Rwanda even before Habyarimana was assassinated. Ugandan intelligence intercepted his communication in which they knew he knew of Museveni’s role in both the assassination of Habyarimana and Ntarymira and the Ugandan death squads Museveni got to dress up as Hutu extremists that would kill Tutsis at random as he had done in Luwero Triangle. Matogo was killed using a slow-acting poison.
71. Hussein Musa Njuki, journalist and editor of Assalaam and former editor of Shariat newsletters, 1995. Killed by agents of Military Intelligence using a poison that induces sudden heart attacks and he was taken to a Kampala police station to die. Njuki had become a strong critic of Museveni and his regime. Museveni used Njuki and Ahmed Seguya as FRONASA men to distribute disinformation in Uganda in the Amin era.
72. Lt. Col. Ladislaw Serwanga Lwanga, former NRA chief political commissar, 1996. Killed by slow-acting poison although he was also HIV-positive, because he was seen as a threat poised by vocal Baganda officers.
73. Lt. Michael Shalita, Intelligence officer with the Internal Security Organisation, 1997. Shot in Kamwokya on orders of Museveni. Shalita was investigating cases of massive corruption involving top government parastatals like the Uganda Revenue Authority and the Uganda Posts & Telecommunications Corporation in which the Museveni family had an interest.
74. Brig. Fred Kamwesiga, 1997? Invited to State House dinner with Museveni and contagious poison put in his plate, for opposing parliamentary candidature of Augustine Ruzindana and calling Ruzindana a Rwandese unfit to run for MP in Uganda .
75. Lt. Col. Reuben Ikondere, UPDF officer, 1998. Murdered in eastern Congo on orders of Museveni for questioning why the First Family was plundering the wealth of Congo yet they claimed to be there to secure Uganda ’s borders. His murder was covered up as a stabbing by the Mai Mai warriors.
76. Dr. Akiiki Mujaju, a lecturer in Political Science at Makerere University and dean of the Social Sciences faculty, 1998?. Mujaju was murdered in a faked car accident along the Kampala-Fort Portal road because he had got sensitive information on the NRM government’s record and was about to publish it.
77. Joanne Cotton, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999. The murders were planned personally by Museveni in order to scare the West and justify Uganda ’s invasion of Congo on the excuse of pursuing the ADF rebels and Rwandan Interahamwe who were accused of committing the crime. At a press conference in Kampala after the killings, Museveni pretended to be very hurt by the tourists’ deaths and took charge of the hunt for the killers.
78. Steve Roberts, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
79. Mark Lindgren, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
80. Martin Friend, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
81. Gary Tappenden, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
82. Rob Haubner, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
83. Susan Miller, One of eight western tourists, killed in Bwindi national park, 1999.
84. Lt. Col. Jet Mwebaze, UPDF officer, 1999. Shot in the forehead in Congo on orders of Salim Saleh with Museveni’s approval, for questioning why Saleh and Museveni’s son Muhoozi Kainerugaba were exporting beef to Congo and looting minerals, instead of looking out for Uganda ’s security interests. The government claimed it was an accident but there was an unexplained gunshot wound on his forehead. His body was returned in a sealed coffin and his family was not allowed to view his body. His brother, General James Kazini, is still convinced that there was foul play in Mwebaze’s death.
85. Anthony Ssekweyama, DP stalwart and human rights activist, 1999. Murdered and a fake car accident staged to cover up, on orders of Museveni after he catalogued Museveni’s murder of high profile Ugandans and the NRA’s atrocities in northern Uganda. Fortunately, forensic evidence of Ssekweyama’s murder was smuggled out of Uganda and to the United States .
86. Charles Owor, national electoral commissioner, 2000. He was shot dead in Kenya by ESO agents and an accident faked after he protested vigorously at the massive rigging that robbed DP presidential candidate the 1996 election. Owor had sensitive and damning evidence of how Museveni rigged the 1996 election.
87. Henry Kayondo, lawyer and DP direhard, 2000. He was poisoned by the same East Bloc KGB poison used to kill Brig. Kamwesiga, which induces sudden heart failure and makes people believe it was a genuine heart attack. Kayondo was a consistent critic of the NRM’s anti-democratic tendencies and Museveni ordered him silenced.
88. Mukono, Uganda Posts & Telecommunications employee, 2000. Mr. Mukono was gunned down at his home in Namungoona the day before he was supposed to testify at a commission probe into shady activities in the company. The killers, sent by Museveni, left with Mukono’s briefcase where he had put files and official documents of evidence.
89. President Laurent Desire Kabila, head of state of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2001. Shot dead by bodyguard of Col. Kahinda Otafiire. An ESO intelligence officer confirmed to Reuters agency that Kabila was dead when the rest of the world was still guessing.
90. Spencer Turomwe, opposition mobiliser and husband to Betty Olive Kamya, 2001. Although he was HIV-positive and was killed by Military Intelligence agents dressed up as doctors using a slow-acting poison injection because of his influence as a mobiliser and vocal NRM government critic. The government said they hoped his widow Betty Kamya would be intimidated by their murder of Turomwe but instead she became bolder as an FDC envoy.
91. Agnes Katama, managing director of SWIPCO procurement company, 2002. She was murdered and her death was blamed on a staged car accident on the Kampala-Fort Portal road because she was beginning to question too much the huge corrupt deals involving the First Family in government procurements.
92. Brig. Gad Wilson Toko, former minister of defence, 2002 Murdered in fake accident. Toko during a session of the peace talks in Nairobi had walked across the table and slapped Museveni, shouting angrily why Museveni a Rwandese was determined to fight “your wars in our country.” Museveni never forgave him for that public slap.
93. Christine Kania, a member of the Constitutional Review Commission, 2002. She was killed on the same day as Brig. Toko
94. Deus Mugizi, former Uganda Airlines manager, 2002. Gunmen came to his home in Bunga outside Kampala and as his mother pleaded for her son’s life, they said they had not come for property but for his life. Mugizi had protested many times at the sale of Uganda Airlines’ routes to the new East African Airlines which is owned in part by the Museveni family. He also knew about the four Airbus planes that Uganda Airlines was supposed to have bought and Museveni siphoned off the money.
95. Jonah Mulindwa, camera man with Presidential Press Unit, 2003. He was an eye witness to some dirty dealings that Museveni was conducting in State House. Museveni has a secret room in State House which only he opens, where he keeps a statue of himself surrounded by bones, skulls, and witchcraft items. One day Mrs. Janet Museveni opened the room, saw the skulls and bones and almost fainted.
96. Francis Ayume, Solicitor General and attorney General, 2004. Shot dead by Anthony Butele and them accident faked. Family was discouraged from viewing Ayume’s body. Ayume had been a strong critic of the Third Term project and was viewed as presidential material.
97. Robinah Kiyingi, Kampala lawyer and country director of Transparency International, 2005. Shot dead outside her home just outside Kampala . She had gathered damning data on her laptop computer on the massive corruption personally sanctioned by Museveni for his family. Transparency International had estimated Museveni’s worth was at $4billion. Museveni gave away his hand in Kiyingi’s murder by saying he had a great interest in following how the case and trial were going.
98. John Garang Demabior, First Vice President of Sudan and chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, 2005. Killed aboard Museveni’s helicopter. Garang had come to Uganda to demand back a huge cache of arms belonging to the SPLA which Museveni had stolen and could not account for. The altimeter on the helicopter was tampered with in order to endanger the craft and the SPLA using global positioning systems established that the helicopter came down inside Uganda and not Sudan as Kampala claimed.
99. Sgt. John Atwine, alleged killer of Robinah Kiyingi, 2005. Poisoned in Luzira prison to cover up evidence of his framing and Museveni’s role in murder of Robinah Kiyingi.
100. Kevin Aliro, Managing Editor, Weekly Observer, 2005. One of Museveni’s main methods of dealing with his opponents since the 1990s has been to hit them when they are HIV-positive and in that way few people see the cause of death as foul play. He did this with Spencer Turomwe and Kevin Aliro, one of the courageous critics of the government. Patriotic sources in intelligence who are disgusted with Museveni’s handling of the country passed this information on to the Opposition that Aliro was actually killed using the poison spray that Winnie Byanyima had feared the government would use on Colonel Besigye while in Luzira.
The Mulindwas Communication Group "With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy" , Groupe de communication Mulindwas "avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie"
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Human Rights Watch-New York, USA, Jan 20: In its 2006 annual report, the NewYork based Human Rights Watch body says Uganda failed to make progress on human rights and its international reputation suffered in 2005. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/uganda12284_txt.htm HRW also says, Uganda’s military courts must respect the jurisdiction of the nation’s superior civilian courts, Human Rights Watch said today. January 19, 2006 Press Release Uganda: Military Must Bow to Civilian Courts
Human Rights Watch-New York, USA Nov 24: The New York based Human Rights Watch has called on the U.S Bush Administration to halt the accelerating political repression in Uganda. In a statement released on Wednesday, Human Rights Watch says the U.S Should Cut Relations With Uganda government forces who stormed Courthouse last week in Uganda’s capital Kampala. Human Rights Watch also says, the Ugandan government should reverse its ban on speech and demonstrations linked to the trial of the main opposition candidate for president, Dr. Kizza Besigye, and end its intimidation of the courts. Human Rights Watch Country Researcher for Uganda, Rone said, “Opposition supporters in Uganda have a right to peacefully protest any aspect of the judicial proceedings. They also have the right to demonstrate in support of their presidential candidate’s freedom.” http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/11/24/uganda12089.htm
New York, USA Dec13: Uganda’s Electoral Commission Must Uphold Presumption of Innocence
Essential Background: Overview of human rights issues in Uganda (Human Rights Watch, December 31, 2
www.hrw.org
Uganda failed to make progress on human rights and its international reputation suffered in 2005. The conflict in northern Uganda claimed victims daily and more than 1.5 million people continued to languish in displaced persons camps, vulnerable to abuses by the brutal Lord?s Resistance Army (LRA) a
Friday, June 3, 2011
Human rights defenders: Let us use the Human rights day to give accountability to donors and citizens
By Vincent Nuwagaba
This article was first published by 256news.com on 10th December 2009
The world is commemorating the human rights day today to mark sixty one years of the Universal Declaration of Human rights. We indeed, have come a long way and a number of people and institutions deserve a pat on the back for the promotion, defence and protection of human rights. I exhort the human rights defenders to use this as an opportunity not for chest- thumping but to assess their efficacy and possibly adjust their strategies.
This should also be used as an opportunity to give accountability to both the donor community and citizens on whose behalf the human rights groups get donor funding. I have been in the human rights field for some time now and while those outside may feel that the human rights groups do quite a big and good job, I strongly feel that we are not yet up to the mark as a lot is still desired.
Since the beginning of this year alone, I have come across innumerable cases of human rights abuses which are never reported. There are very many people who are detained without trial; many are tortured using all the sophisticated means and they are never helped. To make matters worse even the International human rights organisations operating from here are to some extent inefficient. In November, I went to Amnesty International – Africa regional office to report a violation which occurred in August and I was told by the research officer that nothing could be done about it. This begs the question, are we in human rights defence as a passion or we are doing it as a job?
If we are to do human rights work we needn’t do it as a job because if we do it as a job we are bound to be bored or target at the pay cheque at the end of the month. In fact, this explains the reason as to why some organisations choose to leave out some cases because they feel they have enough cases to fill their reports.
The accountability that many civil society organisations give is more in form of the reports than the actual cases they have handled. I have with my naked eye seen organisations which receive donor funds to provide legal aid to the indigent dropping the clients’ cases without explanation to the clients. This is utterly wrong for I have a hunch that the organisations should give accountability both to the donors and to clients on whose behalf they get the funds.
Human rights advocacy like politics should not be used as an avenue for self-enrichment. Rather it should be an avenue through which the actors and practitioners can touch the lives of the underprivileged; human rights defenders should be the voices of the voiceless, the eyes of the blind and the ears of the deaf. Whoever is a human rights defender or politician and aspires to be the richest person in the country can as well start a profit-making company or business and quit politics or human rights work. Genuine politicians and human rights defenders gain by uplifting the welfare of many people not by primitively amassing personal wealth.
Sadly, there are many people who form Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) for self-enrichment and this largely seems to be the trend in Uganda. This partly explains why many organisations no longer talk of constructive criticism of the government but constructive engagement with the government as if criticism in itself is wrong.
We have human rights organisations where you find two people with similar academic credentials with person A earning 5 million shillings while person B earns less than 0.5m. The irony is that the least paid in Uganda are the beasts of burden. Those that spend time in the field and do donkey work are paid peanuts while those who spend time in air-conditioned offices earn a fortune. There are some human rights organisations which don’t respect the ILO conventions that Uganda has ratified and continue to abuse their workers’ rights with impunity.
It is a fact that civil society groups keep the government on its toes and help government sometimes refrain from excesses. Nevertheless, it is also important that government puts in place a mechanism to check the practices of the civil society organisations. Otherwise, it would sound imprudent for civil society organisations to continue blaming the government for being corrupt when the civil society organisations are equally corrupt through inter alia nontransparent recruitments and unjustified wage differentials. In fact there is a difference between human rights workers and activists. Human rights workers can leave a human rights organisation and join a company such as a telecommunication company. All the human rights workers need is money but human rights activists and/or defenders want to see social change. Activists talk, write and use all platforms to address human rights issues. If society is to benefit from the work of human rights organisations we must urge them to hire activists and not merely workers.
Finally, Ugandan human rights activists ought to start advocating for good roads, jobs on meritocracy basis, health facilities, right to food, quality education which I have unceasingly argued that it is a critical tool for social transformation. Education must exhibit the following interrelated and essential features as identified by the UN special Rapporteur on the right to education:
a) Availability which underscores the need for functioning educational institutions to be available in sufficient quantity
b) Accessibility which underpin the need for educational institutions to be accessible to everyone. Accessibility highlights three dimensions namely, non-discrimination, physical accessibility and economic accessibility.
c) Acceptability whereby the form and substance of education have to be acceptable
d) Adaptability which means education must be flexible so it can adapt to the needs of the changing societies
Emphasis on civil liberties and the political rights at the expense of socio-economic rights (which in an actual sense are bread and butter issues) is counterproductive in the very short run. We ought to pause a bit and ask ourselves how many people would have the time to criticize the government if they were gainfully employed? To the human rights defenders, if human rights defence is not our passion, we can as well look for where we belong. The writing is clearly on the wall. For God and my country!
Vincent Nuwagaba is a human rights defender and can be reached via vnuwagaba@gmail.com or +256702843552
This article was first published by 256news.com on 10th December 2009
The world is commemorating the human rights day today to mark sixty one years of the Universal Declaration of Human rights. We indeed, have come a long way and a number of people and institutions deserve a pat on the back for the promotion, defence and protection of human rights. I exhort the human rights defenders to use this as an opportunity not for chest- thumping but to assess their efficacy and possibly adjust their strategies.
This should also be used as an opportunity to give accountability to both the donor community and citizens on whose behalf the human rights groups get donor funding. I have been in the human rights field for some time now and while those outside may feel that the human rights groups do quite a big and good job, I strongly feel that we are not yet up to the mark as a lot is still desired.
Since the beginning of this year alone, I have come across innumerable cases of human rights abuses which are never reported. There are very many people who are detained without trial; many are tortured using all the sophisticated means and they are never helped. To make matters worse even the International human rights organisations operating from here are to some extent inefficient. In November, I went to Amnesty International – Africa regional office to report a violation which occurred in August and I was told by the research officer that nothing could be done about it. This begs the question, are we in human rights defence as a passion or we are doing it as a job?
If we are to do human rights work we needn’t do it as a job because if we do it as a job we are bound to be bored or target at the pay cheque at the end of the month. In fact, this explains the reason as to why some organisations choose to leave out some cases because they feel they have enough cases to fill their reports.
The accountability that many civil society organisations give is more in form of the reports than the actual cases they have handled. I have with my naked eye seen organisations which receive donor funds to provide legal aid to the indigent dropping the clients’ cases without explanation to the clients. This is utterly wrong for I have a hunch that the organisations should give accountability both to the donors and to clients on whose behalf they get the funds.
Human rights advocacy like politics should not be used as an avenue for self-enrichment. Rather it should be an avenue through which the actors and practitioners can touch the lives of the underprivileged; human rights defenders should be the voices of the voiceless, the eyes of the blind and the ears of the deaf. Whoever is a human rights defender or politician and aspires to be the richest person in the country can as well start a profit-making company or business and quit politics or human rights work. Genuine politicians and human rights defenders gain by uplifting the welfare of many people not by primitively amassing personal wealth.
Sadly, there are many people who form Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) for self-enrichment and this largely seems to be the trend in Uganda. This partly explains why many organisations no longer talk of constructive criticism of the government but constructive engagement with the government as if criticism in itself is wrong.
We have human rights organisations where you find two people with similar academic credentials with person A earning 5 million shillings while person B earns less than 0.5m. The irony is that the least paid in Uganda are the beasts of burden. Those that spend time in the field and do donkey work are paid peanuts while those who spend time in air-conditioned offices earn a fortune. There are some human rights organisations which don’t respect the ILO conventions that Uganda has ratified and continue to abuse their workers’ rights with impunity.
It is a fact that civil society groups keep the government on its toes and help government sometimes refrain from excesses. Nevertheless, it is also important that government puts in place a mechanism to check the practices of the civil society organisations. Otherwise, it would sound imprudent for civil society organisations to continue blaming the government for being corrupt when the civil society organisations are equally corrupt through inter alia nontransparent recruitments and unjustified wage differentials. In fact there is a difference between human rights workers and activists. Human rights workers can leave a human rights organisation and join a company such as a telecommunication company. All the human rights workers need is money but human rights activists and/or defenders want to see social change. Activists talk, write and use all platforms to address human rights issues. If society is to benefit from the work of human rights organisations we must urge them to hire activists and not merely workers.
Finally, Ugandan human rights activists ought to start advocating for good roads, jobs on meritocracy basis, health facilities, right to food, quality education which I have unceasingly argued that it is a critical tool for social transformation. Education must exhibit the following interrelated and essential features as identified by the UN special Rapporteur on the right to education:
a) Availability which underscores the need for functioning educational institutions to be available in sufficient quantity
b) Accessibility which underpin the need for educational institutions to be accessible to everyone. Accessibility highlights three dimensions namely, non-discrimination, physical accessibility and economic accessibility.
c) Acceptability whereby the form and substance of education have to be acceptable
d) Adaptability which means education must be flexible so it can adapt to the needs of the changing societies
Emphasis on civil liberties and the political rights at the expense of socio-economic rights (which in an actual sense are bread and butter issues) is counterproductive in the very short run. We ought to pause a bit and ask ourselves how many people would have the time to criticize the government if they were gainfully employed? To the human rights defenders, if human rights defence is not our passion, we can as well look for where we belong. The writing is clearly on the wall. For God and my country!
Vincent Nuwagaba is a human rights defender and can be reached via vnuwagaba@gmail.com or +256702843552
Wednesday, June 1, 2011
NRM 15 point programme
1. Restoration of democracy
2. Restoration of security
3. Consolidation of national unity and elimination of all forms of sectarianism
4. Defending and consolidating national independence
5. Building an independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy
6. Restoration and improvement of social services and rehabilitation of war ravaged areas
7. Elimination of corruption and the misuse of power
8. Redressing errors that have resulted in the dislocation of some sections of the population
9. Cooperation with other African countries
10. Following an economic strategy of a mixed economy
11. The financing of public infrastructure using internal borrowing and creation of employment in the country
12. Focused human resource development and capacity building in the technical and public service sector
13. Preservation and development of our culture
14. Consolidation of programmes which are responsible to gender and marginalized groups
15. Environmental protection and management
2. Restoration of security
3. Consolidation of national unity and elimination of all forms of sectarianism
4. Defending and consolidating national independence
5. Building an independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy
6. Restoration and improvement of social services and rehabilitation of war ravaged areas
7. Elimination of corruption and the misuse of power
8. Redressing errors that have resulted in the dislocation of some sections of the population
9. Cooperation with other African countries
10. Following an economic strategy of a mixed economy
11. The financing of public infrastructure using internal borrowing and creation of employment in the country
12. Focused human resource development and capacity building in the technical and public service sector
13. Preservation and development of our culture
14. Consolidation of programmes which are responsible to gender and marginalized groups
15. Environmental protection and management
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